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Summary  
This thesis examines how the American counterinsurgency effort is developing in three 
provinces of northeastern Afghanistan: Kunar, Nangarhar and Nuristan. Also, it examines 
what features of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States that are affecting the 
counterinsurgency effort there. The focus is not only on internal issues within the provinces 
but also on whether and how external issues, mainly security issues originating from 
Pakistan’s border areas, are compounding difficulties to the current counterinsurgency effort 
in these provinces.           
 Both the military as well as the civilian aspects of the counterinsurgency effort are 
subject to analysis. The analysis of the military aspects of the effort focuses primarily on 
problems related to civilian casualties and the location of firefights. The analysis of what can 
be considered the more civilian aspects focuses mainly on three issues: The engagement of 
the civilian population in reporting on so-called “improvised explosive devices” (IED), the 
use of insurgent courts vs. the use of government courts to solve local disputes, and the safety 
of Afghan government officials in the provinces.      
 Having to deal closely with culture is one of the features of counterinsurgency that 
differentiates it from other types of military campaigns. Among other things, the analyses of 
the cultural aspects show the importance of making the civilian population that supports the 
insurgents “see” that the government is a better alternative than the insurgents. In 
Afghanistan, the counterinsurgents’ ability to produce visible and viable results, whether 
those are well-building programs or large governmental programs, is at the core of making the 
population that supports the insurgents “see” why the government should be supported. To be 
able to achieve this mission, the counterinsurgents, which in the case of Afghanistan are 
outsiders, must be aware of the “human terrain” that they operate within.  
 Finally, the thesis finds that there are a number of interrelated aspects of the 
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan that affect the counterinsurgency efforts in 
Afghanistan, both directly and indirectly. It seems clear that not only the military, but also the 
economic support from U.S. to Pakistan, is of indirect importance. There are strong 
indications that the economic problems facing Pakistan create the soil for recruiting youth to 
extremist groups. Recruitment to these groups will also have consequences for the operations 
in Afghanistan, in particular in the eastern provinces that border Pakistan, and where the 
insurgents operate on both sides. Pakistan’s use of proxy groups, which also operate on both 
sides of the border, affects the counterinsurgency operations both directly and indirectly, 
because the U.S. considers the use of proxy groups as a sign of the Pakistani government’s 
lack of ability or even will to exert political control in their own country. On the other hand, 
the effect of drone strikes in Pakistan, specifically in the eastern provinces, seems to be that 
the U.S. undermines its own credibility in the operations in Afghanistan.    
 In short, the instability in the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan seems to 
contribute to maintaining the political instability within Pakistan, which in turn makes the 
U.S. even more reluctant to give military and economic support to Pakistan. This somewhat 
vicious circle may very well increase the strength of the insurgent groups that have safe 
havens in Pakistan, and thus worsen the conditions for the counterinsurgency operations in 
eastern Afghanistan.  
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“I can tell you, there is nobody who actually understands Afghanistan in a comprehensive 
way, but the virtue of those who continue to work on it for a long time is that we can raise 
your confusion to a higher level.” 
- Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In its tenth year, the war in Afghanistan seems to have become the symbol of the 9/11 attacks, 
and a glowing example of fast and effective low intensity warfare. At the same time, it 
appears to be a study in how not to conduct low intensity warfare. The war began, it seems, as 
the hallmark of a quick-in-quick-out type of unconventional war, with predominant use of 
airpower and Special Forces units to retaliate for the September 11 attacks and remove the 
Taliban from power. However, ten years later, it has become a quagmire for the United States 
and the international coalition. It started as retaliation, but turned out to become a complex 
counterinsurgency and stability operation. This thesis examines how the American 
counterinsurgency effort is developing in three provinces of northeastern Afghanistan: Kunar, 
Nangarhar and Nuristan. Also, it examines what features of the relationship between Pakistan 
and the United States that are affecting the counterinsurgency effort there. The focus is not 
only on internal issues within the provinces, but also on whether and how external issues, 
mainly security issues originating from Pakistan’s border areas, are compounding difficulties 
to the current counterinsurgency effort in these provinces.      
 The concept of counterinsurgency (COIN) has been defined in many ways. This thesis 
does not seek to reinvent the wheel and come up with a new definition of counterinsurgency. 
The main objective in this chapter is to examine some of the definitions already in place, and 
on this basis of establishing a framework for analyzing the COIN effort in the three provinces 
of northeastern Afghanistan. 
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1.1 Concepts and Theoretical Frameworks  
1.1.1 The Concept of Counterinsurgency 
The preliminary definition of COIN used in this thesis is a combination of a definition used in 
the COIN field manual created by United States Army and David Kilcullen’s definition.  1 
From this, one can define the U.S. counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as any steps the United 
States is taking to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan as a foreign expeditionary force 
there, assisting the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA), and the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. This is the 
starting point for examining other COIN definitions. However, it is necessary to examine in 
detail some of the several definitions of COIN that exist in order to concretize this 
preliminary definition, as well as to create additional pillars for the theoretical framework. 
This will also provide insight into how and why certain aspects of COIN differ from 
conventional operations, and why these aspects are important for the analysis of the three 
provinces. From the many definitions used to define COIN operations and their content, a 
selection of definitions have been chosen, partly from scholarly literature and partly from 
official documents created by the U.S. government. These have been selected because they 
describe the conditions within the area of operations very well, and they are useful in enabling 
an understanding the position of both policy makers and researchers.   
 In a report from February 2011 for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics, there is a collection of definitions from several entities within the 
U.S. military as well as NATO. These definitions are arguably a good starting point for the 
analysis of the COIN effort in Northeastern Afghanistan. Their core substance may be 
expressed like this: COIN is “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts 
designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike 
conventional warfare, nonmilitary means are often the most effective elements, with military 
forces playing an enabling role.” 2 The emphasis on the difference from conventional warfare 
is important; priority one is not killing or capturing the insurgents, but separating them from 
the populous they hide within.        
 The type of warfare that counterinsurgency represents, makes it by default a difficult 
subject to define in a few sentences. Counterinsurgency operations require that the state 
                                               
1 United States, United States Army The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 
2006: preface 1.1; David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency 2010 
2 United States, Government Interagency COIN Guide 2009: p.2 
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engaging in it has a military that is trained and geared toward that form of activity, in addition 
to incorporating a greater number of government functions. Cooperation between different 
parts of government is of key importance for success. However, by borrowing from 
definitions made by authors of research literature and official documents, it is possible to 
construct a useful definition for this thesis. First, the campaign in Afghanistan is what could 
be defined as an expeditionary counterinsurgency campaign, meaning that there is a foreign 
force that is fighting insurgents in the insurgents’ homeland. 3 This in itself provides the 
expeditionary force with a great number of difficulties compared to if it was fighting a 
domestic insurgency in the expeditionary force’s country of origin. A “comprehensive or full-
spectrum” counterinsurgency includes, but is not limited to: “…political, security, and 
economic tracks, with an underpinning information function (intelligence and “hearts and 
minds”) that integrates all the elements of a campaign.” 4 Another description of what a 
counterinsurgency operation entails is presented in the United States Army Field Manual, 
which defines COIN as: “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”5 In order to create an overall 
definition that covers all these kinds of actions, one could, for the purpose of this thesis, 
define counterinsurgency as any step the United States is taking to combat the insurgency in 
Afghanistan as a foreign expeditionary force assisting the government in Afghanistan.  
1.1.2 Theoretical Perspectives and Parameters for the Empirical Analysis   
On the basis of this overall definition, the main elements of the theoretical framework will be 
derived from the parameters that are used to measure progress in a COIN operation. Success 
may be difficult to measure, and research literature and government documents contain a 
number of parameters. Since this thesis seeks to examine the COIN effort in three provinces, 
and what features of the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan that may impact the 
COIN effort in these provinces, it is necessary to limit the number of parameters. The task 
force that provided the Under Secretary of Defense with recommendations on how COIN and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations should be conducted, has 
included in their report a set of metrics that could be used to examine an evolving 
                                               
3 Kilcullen, David Counterinsurgency 2010: p. 79-80 
4 Kilcullen, David The Accidental Guerilla 2009: p. 112 
5 United States, United States Army The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 
2006: preface 1.1 
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counterinsurgency operation.
 6
 For the purpose of this analysis, these metrics are too many, 
and in certain cases they require access to documents and intelligence that a student would not 
have access to; therefore, a selection of these metrics will be utilized to examine the 
counterinsurgency effort in each province. These metrics have been selected because they 
can, to a certain extent, be found in available reports and by following news stories. Some 
have also been chosen because ISAF freely distributes statistics. The following section will 
present the main metrics that are chosen for the purpose of this thesis, and will explain what 
aspects of the COIN operations they are meant to measure. As will be seen, the relation to and 
interaction with the local people is of crucial importance in order to make progress in a COIN 
campaign. Therefore, the most relevant types of metrics to map and measure the quality of the 
kind of events that are most important in this respect have been selected. In the next section 
we will present and discuss the sources and methods for using the chosen metrics in the 
analyses of the COIN effort in this thesis.       
 David Kilcullen originally devised the metrics. He divides them into four categories: 
“The population, the supported (host nation) government, the security forces (military and 
police), and the enemy.” 7 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) reporting is one of the metrics 
in the population category. In the three provinces there is a clear and high level of insurgent 
violence. Because of the high level of violence in the provinces, IED reporting will be a 
relevant metric, specifically in the provinces Kunar and Nuristan which are provinces with a 
high level of insurgent activity. It will be useful to use IED reporting as one of the metrics for 
examining not only how the effort is evolving in these provinces, but also to allow for 
comparison with the province of Nangarhar, which has relatively fewer violent attacks.
 8
 
 The local community’s use of local government versus Taliban courts is another 
indicator that can be used to examine progress in the region.
 9
 There have been several studies 
that examine this phenomenon over the last ten years. In addition to adding value to the 
assessment of the evolution of COIN, the local population’s use of the court system will tell 
us something about how the local communities view their own security situation. We can 
assume that a higher level of government court use indicates that the population’s faith in the 
government’s ability to assert control in the region and maintain security is higher. It would 
                                               
6 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p. 75 
7 Ibid. p.75 (Report COIN & ISR) 
8Jaffe, Gregg Six U.S Soldiers killed in Afghanistan operation near Pakistan border Washington Post April 1 
2011 
9 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p 76 
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stand to reason that a higher Taliban court use would be equivalent of less or weaning trust 
toward the government and its abilities. Because of this, court use seems to be a metric that is 
relevant in all three provinces.         
 Public perception of government institutions will therefore be one of the core metrics 
that will be used in the analysis of the provinces. This can also be measured through assessing 
the level of security for government officials. Whether they have been in the provinces that 
they administer and how they are received, are indicators that may say something about the 
general perception toward the government. If the person who is administering the province 
and his aides are able to travel freely to the province without attempts on their life or IED 
attacks, one can consider the government’s ability to work in that region better than in other 
more hostile ones.
 10
 An example of the importance of visiting government officials can be 
seen in Faryab province in northern Afghanistan. Coalition forces go to a Pashtun (Afghan 
ethnicity) village to attend a Shura
11
 with the provincial power brokers. The meeting 
progresses badly specifically because of the provincial officials’ unwillingness to come to the 
Shura. This creates mistrust, because it has been illustrated to the villagers in the area that the 
regional government does not seem to bother with their problems, and do not come out to 
meet with them to discuss how to improve the situation.
 12
 If provincial officials will not come 
to visit a village that is being secured by close to a hundred armed coalition forces, it is not 
likely that they would make trips into areas where insurgents have established clear footholds. 
As the insurgency develops, it would be highly likely that the areas suffering greater insurgent 
activity would become increasingly isolated from government initiatives, because official 
contact is constricted.          
 In conjunction with the use of official or Taliban courts, which perform the actual 
public safety function, it is of importance to the analyses how well the COIN effort in any 
given province is going.
 13
 Because the insurgent groups have been efficient in establishing 
courts, it would be helpful to examine whether or not the population in an area is aware of the 
government, and to what extent they accept it. An example that illustrates the relevance of 
this metric is a text found in the Sagin Valley in 2009. The booklet by Mullah Omar very 
specifically states how one should treat violations of the laws in the regions that the Taliban 
                                               
10 Ibid. p. 77 (Report COIN & ISR) 
11 Shura is a meeting between the elders of a village or province in which they discuss important issues, among 
them politics and relations to coalition forces and insurgents 
12 NRK The Afghani Nightmare 2011 (49min 33sek) 
13 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p 80 
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or Mujahedin control. The text states that “[I]f local people come to the Mujahidin with their 
personal problems, the leader of the group has no right to get involved. Only the provincial 
and district authorities will consider the issues. They will try to have tribal leaders solve the 
problem. If this is not possible, they have to take the issue to the provincial court.” 14 This 
illustrates the importance of making sure the population of a district or village has faith that 
the government in Kabul is not impotent, and that it really does have an interest in the 
outlying regions. Also, the level of corruption in a region directly affects issues of trust in the 
local government. The more officials from the GOA that use their position for their own 
benefit, the more hold the Taliban and insurgents will gain over a region. It may not be an 
immediate effect, but over the long term this would be an important indicator for the 
evolution of the COIN effort in that region.
 15
      
 Every time a combat engagement happens in Afghanistan, it is not only the soldiers 
and insurgents who are involved. The people of that area are also watching and judging the 
firefight; it could be local media, national media or international media. As soon as the 
firefight ends, it might be possible to watch it as a replay from a news camera or have locals 
explain with commentary. This underlines another important metric; the location of a 
firefight.
 16
 It is of importance whether or not the people in the village see coalition and 
Afghan National Army (ANA) forces as an aggressor toward their village. If the coalition 
forces are in the village and have been securing it, it is likely that the insurgents will be 
viewed as the aggressor. They will be considered the cause of any collateral damage that 
occurs. This is not to say that the coalition forces are completely “absolved” from any 
necessary or unnecessary damage. However, one can say that “they” (the insurgents) started 
it. The relative location of security forces therefore becomes precarious when engaging the 
insurgents. The location of the point of firefight then becomes a metric that can be useful.
 17
 How security forces conduct their missions is critical in understanding the use of this 
metric. For example, if the security forces stay in the field over an extended period of time, 
this could indicate that they feel secure about their ability to join the local population in the 
region where they are operating. This shows the population in the region that the security 
forces are able to withstand insurgent attacks, and that they are confident enough not to 
                                               
14 Omar, Mullah, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate: Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin 2009: p. 9 
15 Kilcullen, David Measuring Progress in Afghanistan 2009: p. 11 
16 Ibid. p. 14 (Measuring Progress in Afghanistan) 
17 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p 82 
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withdraw back to their compounds at night.
 18
 In the context of staying in the field for 
extended periods of time, nighttime operations are important. However, this could be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it would make sense to undertake raids at night 
because of the aggressive stance it shows. This would give the security forces the ability to 
confiscate weapons or to capture insurgents in villages when they sleep. On the other hand, by 
doing so they could also make the local population who are affected by these operations less 
cooperative, because the security forces operations are directly affecting them in a negative 
way.
 19
           
 Another metric closely related to the location of firefights has to do with civilian 
casualties. It is of utmost importance that operations from the security forces’ standpoint are 
close to the population, but without conducting operations that cause significant civilian 
casualties. By being close to the population, the security forces seek to be seen as the 
providers of local safety, and not as a threat to it. This covers how the forces conduct 
themselves when they are on patrol; are they dismounted or not, are they operating in small 
units alongside ANA or ANP or both, to what extent do they use airpower and artillery, and 
are they always repeating the same patrol patterns.
 20
 Patrol patterns means simply that a 
different route is chosen by a unit on each patrol, so as to not establish a repetitive pattern. All 
of these issues that relate to the security forces from an analytical perspective are dealt with as 
related indicators in the analysis of each of the three provinces and the COIN effort.  
 In addition to the aforementioned metrics, there is one metric that is not used in this 
thesis directly in relation to analyzing the COIN effort, but primarily when examining the 
relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. This metric is mentioned in both Kilcullen’s work 
and in the task force report, and has to do with enemy indicators. The reason for using this as 
a parameter for the analysis of this relationship is that many of the insurgents infiltrate 
Afghanistan from the areas that border Pakistan. The insurgents are using areas in the FATA 
and NWFP as “safe” havens from which they can regroup, rearm and replenish casualties. 21 It 
is because of this ability to exfiltrate into Pakistan that this indicator is important for both 
parts of the analysis. High technology use like satellite phones and high power scopes, gives 
indications that the insurgents are better trained, and that they are full time fighters; not local 
                                               
18 Ibid. p. 83 (COIN & ISR) 
19 Kilcullen, David Measuring Progress in Afghanistan 2009: p. 14 
20 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p. 82-84 
21 Council on Foreign Relations U.S Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan 2010: p. 45-47 
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guerilla fighters that have been called upon.
 22
 Also if these columns of fighters are working 
with specialists or foreign advisors, this could be an indication that they are based in Pakistan 
rather than Afghanistan, which is an aspect of how relations between the U.S. and Pakistan 
may be affecting Afghanistan’s stability.        
 To sum up: The parameters for examining the COIN effort in the three provinces are a 
combination of improvised explosive device (IED) reporting, GOA officials’ safety in the 
regions, and the use of legal systems meaning insurgent courts or relying on the government 
to solve disputes. These could be considered the civilian aspect of the effort. For the military 
aspect, a combination of two metrics is used to understand the how the effort is evolving. That 
is the location of firefights or enemy engagements and what kinds of civilian casualties are 
experienced. In addition, the ability to conduct operations over longer periods of time, and 
what kind of operations have been conducted, is a parameter of relevance to both the civilian 
and military aspects of the COIN effort. All of these metrics together are used in the analyses 
of the various kinds of situations, and in trying to understand how the effort has evolved. 
Even though they are intertwined, the use of the metrics most relevant to analyze the military 
and the civilian aspects of COIN are respectively presented in two separate sections (in 
chapter 2).            
 The aforementioned parameters represent in sum a perspective that is relevant to 
analyzing the most important aspects of the very complex character of COIN operations. In 
addition to this, there is a more general perspective that has to do with culture, which 
represents some key aspects of COIN. This perspective has been termed the “population-
centric” COIN, and some exemplification is necessary to present an understanding of the 
importance of the “population-centric” COIN efforts. The insurgents are using the local 
population to hide, and by being able to hide among the population, the insurgents make it 
exceedingly difficult for the counterinsurgents to effectively combat the insurgents without 
causing a significant amount of collateral damage. This could be civilian casualties, 
destruction of property, or other disruptive reactions.
 23
 David Kilcullen emphasizes that 
precise and careful action must be taken when combating the insurgents. The key to this is 
strict adherence to laws and rules of engagement, as to not alienate the population one seeks 
to cooperate with, and the imperative to protect them from harm:
 24
 “The reason for this is 
                                               
22 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 2011: p. 86 
23 Kilcullen, David Counterinsurgency 2010 p. 7 
24 Kilcullen, David Counterinsurgency 2010 p. 7 
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simple, and it derives from two very distinct features of insurgent movements: That they rely 
on local populations, and while the guerillas are fluid, populations are fixed.” 25 This insight is 
the cornerstone of any counterinsurgency effort. It rests upon the ability of the 
counterinsurgents to be able to achieve an environment where they are in control, and where 
the population in that specific area supports, at least to a certain extent, the counterinsurgents’ 
efforts to effectively establish control. One cannot expect every citizen in the area to support 
the efforts, but one needs a significant amount of the population to see the counterinsurgency 
as a viable option for creating a stable security environment, and not as a threat to the security 
of the population. Control in this case must be seen as control over an area where the 
counterinsurgency provides security, not only for the counterinsurgents but for the population 
in that area as well. This means denying the insurgents easy access to the area through the 
counterinsurgents staying and holding it for a prolonged period of time.    
 As has been noted, these aspects of counterinsurgency are designated as “population-
centric,” and this focus on the “human terrain” is of key importance to the realization of the 
COIN strategy.
 26
 COIN requires a deeper understanding of the people, power structures, and 
culture that exists in the region where operations are taking place. Using John A. Nagl’s 
expression regarding how it is important to not implement a “sledgehammer approach” to 
COIN is instructive.
27
 It is important to use the right tool for the job, and for COIN purposes, 
it would be counterproductive to use the sledgehammer approach when the insurgents are 
hiding within the population and are not in a position to be neutralized surgically, thereby 
creating a situation where the effort would suffer because of the use of a wrong approach. 
Field Manual 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN  (FMI 3-24.2) states seven key “rules of conduct” 
regarding the population-centric aspects of the COIN strategy: “1. Establish civil security 2. 
Establish civil control 3. Support Host Nation (HN) security forces 4. Support governance 5. 
Restore essential services 6. Support to economic and infrastructure development 7. Conduct 
information engagement.” 28 As we see from these seven points, it is imperative not only that 
the counterinsurgents adhere to national and international law, but also that the HN security 
forces must be trained and mentored in a way that allows for the building of trust between the 
local populations and the nation’s government. This aspect is of particular importance, 
                                               
25 Kilcullen, David Counterinsurgency 2010 p. 7 
26 United States, Government Interagency COIN Guide 2009: p. 14 
27 Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife 2005: p. 30 
28 United States Army, Field Manual 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN 2009 preface, United States, Department of 
Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) Operations 2011: p. 21 
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because the timeline for the expeditionary force is shorter than the insurgents. The insurgents 
have time on their side; once security has been established and control has been given to the 
HN’s security forces, they may remain dormant or inactive in the area in anticipation of the 
withdrawal of the large foreign force.        
 An example of this was the withdrawal of troops from the Kamdish district in 
Nuristan. After the U.S. forces left, the Taliban moved in and secured a hold over the district, 
and they began appointing Taliban officials for the region.
 29
 This illustrates the need for not 
only a close cooperation between expeditionary forces and the HN forces, but also that the 
threat of losing their hard won control, once the coalition or U.S. forces leaves an area, is a 
very real one that must continually be assessed when talking of withdrawing from a region. 
Points three and four of the FMI 3-24.2 are, as we can see from this example, key to a 
continuous COIN effort once the majority of foreign security forces leave an area. This may 
be one of the most important aspects of COIN, because the counterinsurgent is advised in all 
guides and manuals that a COIN operation can be expected to be protracted and slow in 
progress.
 30
 It would therefore seem that by default a COIN operation is nearly impossible to 
complete without a tremendous effort on behalf of the expeditionary force conducting it. This 
is not necessarily the case, but the effort requires an approach that involves a significant part 
of both the expeditionary government and the HN’s government to be successful. 31  
 Finally, the term “security issue” in this thesis will refer to an existing situation within 
the area of operations (AO) that poses a significant threat directly or indirectly to American 
personnel or their Afghani counterparts, as well as to the civilian populations in the provinces 
in question. This definition contains a contextual aspect, which allows for analysis of the 
threat without being confined by a narrow scope definition.     
 Considering all the aforementioned cultural issues that are relevant because of the 
population-centric aspects of COIN, it might be said that the cultural issues that the 
counterinsurgents face in Afghanistan are arguably as multifaceted as the definition of 
counterinsurgency itself. Therefore, the more specific meaning of the importance of an 
understanding of Afghan culture to the COIN operations will be elaborated by the examples 
that presents the various kinds of situations where the forces are confronted these issues. 
 A part of the integral analyses of the COIN operations in Eastern Afghanistan that this 
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30 United States, Department of Defense, Interagency Report on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, 
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thesis also has to answer is the question of why the relationship the U.S. has with Pakistan is 
significant to the analysis of COIN in three provinces of Afghanistan. To answer this 
question, more components have to be considered. Firstly, a significant part of fighters in 
Afghanistan originate from bases or madrassas in Pakistan. The Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas and North Western Frontier Province are unstable areas, not only for the U.S. 
and Afghanistan but also for Pakistan itself, because it is not able to enforce law; the areas are 
decentralized from much of the government’s reach. 32 The United States is continually 
conducting “covert” drone strikes inside Pakistan. The most notorious terrorist leader of the 
21
st
 century was killed inside its borders. Pakistan is a nuclear power with a weak government 
that is inextricably linked to the military elite.
 33
 How Pakistani officials treat the stability in 
their regions that border Afghanistan appears to have an effect on the COIN effort and the 
transition effort in these provinces. It would seem that if relations between the U.S. and 
Pakistan were reasonably good, this would lead to a much firmer response on the part of the 
Pakistani government in securing the border areas and retaining some resemblance of 
stability. This is not something that the Pakistani government would do for the sole purpose of 
continuing good relations with the U.S., but also in order to show the world that they are not a 
weak state. Achieving stability is therefore an objective that is in U.S. interest, and that should 
be in Pakistan’s interest as well. 34 Pakistan’s reactions to U.S. operations within Pakistan is 
thus another indicator that will help explain how the relations between these states influence 
Afghanistan’s stability, as well as Pakistani stability.      
 Though it would be difficult to establish with certainty a cause and effect that 
immediately illustrates a link between what happens in these areas and the stability in 
Afghanistan. The objective of this thesis is limited to examining factors that could indicate 
trends from which one can make a fair assumption. If there is a surge of fighting in FATA, 
there could also possibly be a detectable influx of fighters in the provinces of eastern 
Afghanistan. How difficult it is to cross the border into Afghanistan from Pakistan is an 
indicator of how successful the Pakistani government is in their strategy to maintain stability 
in the tribal areas. Also if the U.S. is successful in its strategy for Afghanistan, then that 
should indicate a drop in incidents involving foreign fighters and full time fighters from 
across the border. The more local fighters there are, the more it indicates a high degree of 
                                               
32 Reidel, Bruce Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad 2011: p. 82, 92-93 
33 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and May, Clifford D. et. al The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam, 
Security & Stability 2010: p. 30 
34 Ibid. p. 15-16  
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support, in which case the COIN effort may have failed, and the transition to Afghan 
responsibility might be premature. Understanding the evolution of the effort, who the enemy 
is, and how culture is important, will aid in understanding whether this is an issue that is 
affected by the ambivalent relationship between the United States and Pakistan involving 
foreign fighters and full time fighters. Chapter four is devoted to an analysis of these issues. 
     
 The conceptual apparatus presented above makes up the theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the counterinsurgency’s successes and failures in the three provinces. The use of 
different examples will give the necessary depth and width to analyze how the 
counterinsurgency efforts in these provinces are evolving, and to what extent and in what way 
the efforts are affected by their proximity to Pakistan’s border areas. The use of a comparative 
approach to examine certain aspects of the conflicts in the areas of operation, by comparing 
the development in the two provinces Kunar and Nuristan to the development in Nangarhar, 
allows the analysis to be more specific because of the possibilities of comparing similarities 
and differences. This appears to be most useful when dealing with the tribal areas in Pakistan 
and their effect on the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Comparing how the Pakistani 
military is conducting their counterinsurgency effort in the FATA as well as the NWFP, will 
illustrate how some aspects of it must be dealt with differently in Afghanistan than in 
Pakistan, and how Pakistan may be directly or indirectly affecting the effort in Afghanistan.  
 
1.2 Sources and Methods 
The fluidity of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan in correlation with the U.S. effort 
causes a particular source problem. Because the actions taken by the counterinsurgents and 
the reactions of the insurgency to these actions evolve as rapidly as they do, changes are made 
within a smaller timeframe compared to a conventional conflict. The rapid changes made 
regarding recommendations and actions therefore mean that special care has to be taken to 
ensure that dates on primary material are carefully considered before being used in other 
contexts with newer information. A course of action or recommendation could have been 
important regarding a specific village or insurgent network, but because of the high speed 
flow of information from Afghanistan, certain aspects of analysis and success can be 
monitored almost daily. This is not to say that older documents are not beneficial, but in this 
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case it is important to analyze the sources without comparing materials that are more than six 
or seven years old with documents that are recent. This is because one paper could have been 
written before a specific event that altered the situation, making the previous paper not as 
valid as it possibly was.         
 The primary sources that are used consist of government papers that address the 
conflict directly, or that have direct impact on the actions in the country. These sources will 
be White Papers, National Intelligence Estimates and remarks made by the presidents of the 
different countries. With regard to these primary sources, it will be of great importance to use 
sources that are not exclusively American or written by pro-American scholars from the 
countries in question. The use of Pakistani and Afghan primary sources is imperative to 
enable a more nuanced understanding of subjects dealing with the conflict in Afghanistan and 
the tribal areas that border it. It will also serve to allow for a, however limited, comparison 
with American policy makers’ views on the subject.     
 One could argue that through using research material that for the most part originates 
from American and coalition sources, the analysis of the counterinsurgency effort in Nuristan, 
Nangarhar, and Kunar could become one sided, as the Government of Afghanistan and the 
provincial governments are underrepresented in this analysis. There are several reasons for 
this asymmetry in the source material; the main reason is the lack of digitalized material on 
their government websites. This makes it difficult for the purpose of this thesis to obtain these 
documents. Second, the Pakistani government has few open source databases on their own 
activities in the border areas that can be analyzed. Therefore it is more difficult to assess their 
response through primary sources, and this must be done in the context of their interaction 
with the U.S. government through American official documents and scholarly writing. 
Specifically the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistani intelligence service) has a very limited 
website with no searchable database similar to the one the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
has on their website. However, scholars and American personnel who have written reports 
and books on the subject of counterinsurgency give a certain insight into how the effort has 
been perceived by the population in the areas of operation, as well as the government officials 
in the region through interviews with tribal elders and officials.    
 News reports and articles will also serve as a necessary and important source of 
material; interviews made by agencies that belong to the host nation may provide a view that 
would be unavailable through western media sources. Reports made in the field will also be 
used; specifically the revised Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was issued in 2007 will 
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serve as an important lens through which to examine actual implementations in the field 
compared to the theoretical framework that the field manual provides. The newsletters COIN: 
Common Sense and Freedom Watch, which are produced by Regional Command East, will be 
used as an important primary source, as it is written by soldiers who are participating in the 
counterinsurgency effort in East-Afghanistan. There have been several issues of this 
newsletter, which specifically deals with the counterinsurgency effort in the areas of 
operation. Using these newsletters as a basis for comparison with official documents and 
reports regarding the effort will enhance the analysis as it provides the “top-down” view on 
counterinsurgency, as well as a “bottom-up” point of view from the soldiers on the ground 
conducting the counterinsurgency effort. To examine the differences between these is 
imperative to the analysis of the counterinsurgency effort, because the strategic planning is 
significantly broader in its scope and covers a longer time span than the tactical planning and 
execution. This difference can provide insight into how the theory and ideas on the strategic 
level may not be compatible with the situation on the ground, and to help understand how the 
tactical environment is evolving.
 35
         
 Secondary sources will consist of reports, analyses, scholarly essays, and books that 
review the subject of counterinsurgency within Afghanistan, Pakistan and America. A large 
number of these authors are personnel who have been involved in the military operations in 
the provinces in question, and/or who are scholars native to countries that have been on the 
ground in Afghanistan or have conducted counterinsurgency operations in other theaters. 
Important to the analysis of the counterinsurgency effort will be the works of David Kilcullen 
and John A. Nagl, whom are both considered the foremost scholars on counterinsurgency. 
Kilcullen was one of the chief advisors to General Petraeus and his counterinsurgency effort 
in Iraq. Nagl was one of the editors of the new field manual. He has conducted 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and has written extensively about this topic along with 
Kilcullen. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one serves to establish the framework for analysis and what restrictions the subject 
requires. The subject of counterinsurgency is controversial and causes divided opinions 
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among scholars. The works of a selection of authors who could be considered authorities will 
illustrate this when compared to military views on the subject. These in turn will vary from 
those of policy makers. It is therefore important in chapter one to present explicitly the 
framework that will be adopted in this thesis.      
 Some basic knowledge of how the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan has 
evolved over a timeline of almost ten years is important for the understanding of current 
events. Chapter two starts out with a short review the most important events in this regard. 
This serves as a backdrop for a presentation of the new COIN strategy and its most important 
elements. Against this background, the main objective of this chapter is to undertake an 
empirically based analysis of the implementation of this strategy, focusing and the COIN 
efforts in the provinces Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar as they have evolved since 2009. The 
analyses make use of the conceptual framework that is established in chapter one in an 
attempt to assess how the military as well as the civilian aspects of the COIN efforts seem to 
have evolved in these provinces. From the vast empirical material, the kind of events and 
incidents selected are the ones most relevant in relation to the metrics applied for the analysis; 
civilian casualties and location of fire, IED reporting and incidents, use of nongovernmental 
agencies such as shadow courts, and the safety of officials. In addition, the chapter also 
analyzes actions and other events that may have created environments that incur friction on 
the counterinsurgency effort, and on the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.
 36
 Understanding the culture of the intricate tribal communities in Afghanistan and the 
border areas of Pakistan is an important part of the analysis of counterinsurgency in these 
regions. The cultural aspects that are most important to deal with in the COIN efforts are 
presented and analyzed in chapter three. It would appear that in a substantial part of the 
literature, the buzzwords when it comes to counterinsurgency are cultural understanding and 
local knowledge. It would seem that this aspect of COIN is one that suffers from 
underdevelopment. The effect of this undeveloped aspect of the counterinsurgency creates the 
foundation for chapter four, in connection with aspects discussed in the previous two 
chapters. Kilcullen’s term “accidental guerilla” is important for the discussion on how cultural 
ties dictate actions and reactions in these areas.
 37
 This cultural understanding will serve as the 
lens through which the actions of both Pakistan and the U.S. are viewed. It is also necessary 
to understand how the people who live in the affected areas where these two countries seek to 
                                               
36 This term was coined by Karl Von Clausewitz in On War (1832)  
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establish control, see and react to the forces that are on the ground.   
 Chapter four is devoted to analyses of those aspects of the U.S.–Pakistani relations 
that seem to have most impact on the COIN efforts in Afghanistan. One main focus is the 
apparent tensions between Pakistan’s domestic policy and foreign policy, which in turn create 
tensions in the relationship between U.S. and Pakistan. The second main focus is about 
Pakistan’s reactions to the conflict in Afghanistan and the actions it is taking in the FATA and 
NWFP, including the use of proxy forces. Pakistan’s reactions to the conflict in Afghanistan 
and the actions it is taking in the FATA and NWFP will be the main focus in Chapter three. 
Pakistan’s effort to combat the radicalization and development of Taliban and fundamentalist 
fighters in the tribal areas will be reviewed in order to achieve a clearer understanding of the 
domestic issues within this area of Pakistan. That area seems to have become a central 
security issue for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. An analysis of the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) will be part of this chapter because of its instrumental role in 
creating the schools (madrassas) that are aiding the recruitment and training of insurgent 
fighters that go on to affect the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. This analysis of the 
Pakistani “part” of the problem will allow for further analysis of the interconnectedness 
between the Pakistani border areas and the American counterinsurgency efforts in 
Afghanistan. Thirdly, the U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan and the reactions to them are 
analyzed in relation to the COIN efforts.        
 In chapter five some main points from the preceding analyses are recapitulated, and a 
certain synthesis of the partial analyses and conclusions regarding the various components 
and aspects of the COIN effort is presented. Also, the question of to what extent the 
relationship between Pakistan and America is critically affecting the counterinsurgency effort 
in the three provinces, is reconsidered on the basis of the preceding analyses. The complex 
political relationship between the United States and Pakistan that is played out through 
cooperation as well as direct defiance, are the key components in this reconsideration. On the 
basis of the attempt to synthesize some of the complex patterns and dynamics between the 
various aspects of the overall situation in this region today, this concluding chapter also 
briefly discusses the planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and how this will impact 
the security environment in the country. A critical look at the relations between military, 
cultural, and political issues that represent future as well as current issues, will allow for the 
final and concluding comment on in what ways the external issues with Pakistan and America 
are affecting the military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan 
The campaign in Afghanistan has been long, and it is no less complex today than it was six 
years ago. It has been front page news and has gone from that position to barely receiving a 
byline. It was overshadowed by the invasion and war in Iraq, and lessons learned about COIN 
in Iraq gave way to a change of strategy in Afghanistan. General McChrystal and General 
Petraeus assumed command in Afghanistan after successfully conducting counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations in Iraq; they were also instrumental in developing current U.S doctrine on 
the subject, as well as being major contributors to the FMI 3.24. The timeline that will be 
examined in this chapter is from the beginning of 2009 up to today, though a rather quick 
examination of previous years is necessary to understand the developments in 2009. The 
chapter starts with a rather quick examination of the three previous years, as a necessary 
background to the presentation of the new COIN strategy that was launched in 2009. On this 
basis the chapter is devoted to an analysis of how the implementation of the COIN strategy 
has evolved in three eastern provinces of Afghanistan, by using the parameters and metrics 
presented in chapter one as the analytical tools for assessing the COIN effort. The main part 
of the chapter is devoted to analyzing the efforts in Kunar and Nuristan. The effort in these 
two provinces is analyzed under common headings, since the two provinces, as will be seen, 
have much in common regarding the conditions for undertaking the COIN effort. The analysis 
of the efforts in the third province, Nangarhar, has its main focus partly on what are the 
important differences from the experiences made in Kunar and Nuristan, and on the most 
important aspects of the COIN effort which are peculiar to Nangarhar. 
 
2.1 The Backdrop for the New Strategy 
In 2006, the Bush administration was more focused on the upcoming surge in Iraq than events 
in Afghanistan. The insurgency was not the only problem facing Afghanistan, and it seems 
that though some military resources were being directed to deal with the security issues there, 
the main focus was on the ongoing war in Iraq. Troop levels illustrate that difference; as of 
2006 there were 20,400 American troops on the ground in Afghanistan. In comparison there 
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were 141,100 in Iraq.
 38
 The troop levels in Iraq were almost seven times that of the levels in 
Afghanistan. This illustrates the backseat that the campaign in Afghanistan had taken. That 
year, responsibility for security in Afghanistan was assumed entirely by NATO Joint 
Command, and that helped divert attention to the conflict because of renewed responsibility 
by the international coalition. 
39
 When NATO assumed command over the security in the 
country, the insurgency began to intensify. This signaled that a change in strategy was needed 
to be able to effectively deal with the insurgency.       
 The Bush administration, which was not as focused on Afghanistan as on the conflict 
in Iraq, seemed to treat the conflict there as a counterterrorism operation rather than what it 
had developed into, a stability and counterinsurgency operation.
40
 In one of his speeches in 
early 2006, Bush presents the doctrine that if any government harbors terrorists in their 
country, then they themselves are no better.
 41
 It would seem that through this speech he laid 
out what he saw as the new type of war against a new global threat, namely terrorism. He 
acknowledged that winning the peace in Iraq would be difficult, but said that in the 
Afghanistan conflict, the U.S. was making headway, and that Afghanistan was on its way to 
become a fledgling democracy.
 42
 This could indicate that the administration viewed the fight 
as being fought well enough with the “enemy centric” (“enemy centric” refers to a main focus 
on removing the enemy by force) approach to Afghanistan, seeing it as an “easier” fight than 
Iraq was, and that its importance in the global war on terror was not as important as it had 
been after the September 11 attacks. The Iraq war overshadowed the campaign in 
Afghanistan, but Bush was aware in 2006 that the key to success in Afghanistan laid with 
achieving a stable government. With that in mind however, the resources were needed 
elsewhere, i.e. Iraq, and Afghanistan was still on the bench in terms of policy focus.  
 In the later part of 2005 it seemed that Afghanistan was on its way to achieve this goal. 
Karzai’s government was in place and there had been parliament elections for the first time in 
over three decades.
 43
 However, 2006 marked a point in the campaign where there were 
doubts about whether or not hard fought victories were crumbling; that the stabilization effort 
was going in the wrong direction. It also signified the return of a stronger Afghan insurgency 
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led by what appeared to be a coalition of Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. The 
insurgency that had evolved was far more organized than the U.S. had expected.
44
 This is not 
to say that there had been peace or even calm before 2006, but that year became a high water 
mark for the resurgence of a concerted and motivated insurgency that had been gaining 
strength rather than declining, and that was moving from pockets of resistance toward more 
organized attacks.  
         
2.2 The New Strategy 
The new type of warfare that was gradually emerging had different requirements than what 
the American army was structured for. The military was structured toward nation against 
nation wars, where conventional armies met on what could be described as a “normal” 
battlefield. Additionally, the American military machine was overstretched and could not 
cope with two counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time.
45
 Thus, it would take the 
almost complete withdrawal of forces from Iraq and a new President before a clear change in 
the strategy and a renewed focus on Afghanistan was apparent. President Obama as he 
assumed office in 2009 made it clear that it was time for a change in the strategy the U.S. had 
for Afghanistan. At the time the war had gone on for eight years and it would seem that the 
early success of ousting the Taliban regime was fading and that the liberators were beginning 
to resemble something that the Afghani population recognized from decades earlier, invaders, 
the Russian invasion and the subsequent civil war after it. The U.S. effort in Afghanistan was 
becoming, what could be described as, a double edged sword. On the one hand U.S. and 
coalition forces were being viewed more and more as invaders, on the other Afghans not only 
faced these invaders but also when the coalition forces left an area, the insurgents would come 
back and coerce help from the same people and most likely punish those who had cooperated. 
Against this background Obama declared that one of his first priorities was to get several 
reviews that would assess the needs of the military effort in Afghanistan and make 
recommendations on what was needed.
 46
 The recognition that there was a definite need for 
change is illustrated by the following quotation:      
 “The situation is increasingly perilous. It has been more than seven years since the Taliban 
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was removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily. Most 
painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.”47     
 This analysis was sets the tone for the Obama administration’s approach. President 
Obama publicly acknowledges that America was not achieving success Bush claimed in his 
2006 speech. Further he also emphasizes that he has already sent more than 17.000 additional 
troops to reinforce the COIN effort in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan.
48
 Because of the 
new approach the administration saw it as necessary to get “fresh blood” in, General Stanley 
McChrystal was chosen for the job.
49
 A key component for the strategy that would develop in 
2009 for progress in Afghanistan was in great part based on the newly appointed ISAF 
Commander’s assessment. During a period of two months General McChrystal assessed the 
situation in Afghanistan. The report that followed this assessment was delivered to Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates in late August of 2009. The core parts of this exhaustive review of 
parameters and requirements for a successful campaign in Afghanistan contained three core 
issues that McChrystal outlined as the key to reversing the situation in Afghanistan. 
 First, the report establishes that there is no possibility of success in Afghanistan 
without the support of the Afghan people. By late 2008 it had been the bloodiest year on 
record in Afghanistan, it does not require a stretch of the imagination that public confidence 
in the U.S led effort was dwindling.
50
 McChrystal said that the key lay with the ability of the 
military effort in Afghanistan to recognize that there was a need for well conducted COIN 
operations. The importance of operations in plural could not be overstated. McChrystal 
recognized that there was more than one insurgency and that there were in fact three regional 
insurgencies that needed to be combated at the same time.
51
 Security was an aspect that the 
report emphasizes strongly. At risk populations, meaning those that have close proximity to 
the insurgents, have to be protected from all threats; not just limited to insurgent activities, but 
also maybe even more importantly from corrupt officials in the government and regaining 
faith in the ISAF mission through carefully conducted operations that do not put them in 
danger. Though he argued that there was more than one insurgency, particular focus was put 
                                               
47 United States, Whitehouse, Remarks made by the President on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
March 27 2009 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ann Scott Tyson, Gen. David McKiernan Ousted as Top U.S Commander in Afghanistan in The Washington 
Post May 12 2009 
50 Jason Burke, NATO Figures Show Surge in Afghanistan Violence in The Guardian 31 January 2009 
51 Stanley McChrystal et. al. Commander’s Initial Assessment 30 August 2009 p. 1-1, 1-2 
21 
 
on the fact that though operations and actions may be separated by distance everything is 
connected and must be treated in that way. One change may affect a large number of areas 
simultaneously which must be taken into account when creating this new strategy.
52
 This was 
one of the great difficulties with the new strategy for this campaign. Each of the regions that 
McChrystal defines must be treated with a separate and specific approach. However, failing to 
have an overarching strategy that encompasses the issues that are national would be 
counterproductive.          
 Second, there had to be a significant change in U.S and ISAF strategy for the conflict. 
The way the conflict was thought of had to be changed in order to achieve progress. 
McChrystal presented one of the main reasons for this need for a change in mentality this 
way: “The conflict in Afghanistan is often described as a war of ideas and perceptions: this is 
true and demands important consideration. However, perceptions are generally derived from 
actions and real conditions.”53 The perceptions that McChrystal had in mind were those of the 
people of Afghanistan. He underlined that focus had to be on the primary objective, which is 
the trust of the Afghani people. He also emphasized that there are four other kinds of actors 
that make up the multifaceted picture that is Afghanistan. These four are: the Government of 
Afghanistan (GOA), ISAF, the insurgents and “external” actors.54 All of these actors within 
the area of operations have to be taken into account, and through a change of strategy within 
the entire U.S effort they have to be at the center of the development of a new strategy. The 
external threats come for the most part from Pakistan and work would have to be done to 
enable the Pakistani government to conduct its own COIN campaign in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) better. The 
dilemma that McChrystal acknowledges is that success without Pakistan does not seem 
possible however, Afghanistan needs more attention and therefore the balance of resources 
and how they are employed is of vital importance. 
55
 This issue illustrates one of the 
difficulties facing the campaign and its inherent complexities. On the one hand development 
of a sustained counterinsurgency on the part of the Pakistani government has to be created 
through assistance from the U.S. On the other hand, without any significant progress in 
Afghanistan, the effort will be countered by the militant groups in the border areas of the two 
countries. Without such progress in Afghanistan, the insurgency can simply lay dormant until 
                                               
52 Ibid. p. 2-3  
53 Ibid. p. 2-3, 2-4  
54 Ibid. p. 2-3, 2-4  
55 Ibid. p. 2-5  
22 
 
the international community runs out of political and public will to continue. 
 Third, time is a vital cornerstone for the insurgency and for the U.S led effort. The 
insurgents have basically all the time in the world to conduct their operations. This is a key 
component of their strategy in remote areas.
 56
 If individuals are threatened with the fact that 
the international coalition will not be around to protect them indefinitely and that the 
insurgents will prevail, then working with the foreign forces makes little sense for these 
individuals. When they do, the people who have supported the “enemy” in the eyes of the 
insurgents will later suffer, or in fact be killed. This has been a tactic that has worked well in 
remote areas where the U.S. forces have not been able to stay in control for extended periods 
of time.
57
 Time is not only important because of its relation to the expeditionary COIN; 
setting down an end date is an absolute necessity for political survival. The problem with 
doing so is that setting that time frame allows the insurgent to devise strategies to counter and 
rebuild knowing what the expected timeframe for, in this case, U.S. operations.   
 The plan that President Obama put forward at the beginning of 2009 was in great part 
based on the review that McChrystal had made, several other reviews and a previous report 
created by Bruce Reidel a former CIA operative.
58
 He as well as McChrystal recommended an 
extensive and broad COIN campaign in Afghanistan to reverse the violence and enable 
stability in the country. In his speech at West Point on December 1, 2009, President Obama 
put forward the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he emphasized in particular 
two things. He had after deliberations, and against his vice President’s view, agreed to 
strengthen and commit to a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Vice-President 
Biden had recommended that Obama move away from the “population-centric” COIN 
approach in favor of a much more hardened counterterrorism approach that focused on 
neutralizing enemy leadership and key personnel.
59
 Biden wanted to focus on killing and 
capturing key Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership figures, and focusing on transition to Afghan 
control rather than prolonging the campaign further than necessary. He also wanted to have a 
better and clearer strategy for dealing with Pakistan, seeing that the insurgency seemed to be 
located there in the border areas between the countries rather mostly in Afghanistan itself.
 60
 
This would come to bear in Obama’s strategy though not exactly as Biden would have 
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wanted. It would continue to become a reinforced COIN operation, a perceived defensive 
stance rather than the offensive one Biden sought.      
 Second, Pakistan’s place in the strategy was to become more pronounced than before 
it was recognized that the negative trends were linked to Pakistan and that it was necessary to 
review the approach toward the country. “In the past,” Obama said, “we too often defined our 
relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed 
to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, 
and mutual trust.” 61 This is the first indication that the COIN operations in Afghanistan 
would become directly linked to efforts in and with Pakistan. It would become a focus of 
more than just logistics and an occasional drone strike. In many cases the Pakistani 
government had reluctantly agreed to these strikes. However, in practice Pakistani reactions 
have ranged from outrage to silent thanks depending on the target and the subsequent reaction 
by population and media.
 62
 This can be directly related to approaches in COIN and to the 
metrics listed above: location and the protection of civilians from collateral damage are 
essential, especially when the drone strikes that the U.S has conducted have been in the tribal 
areas that are on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Peace and stability in the 
region would be structured on this renewed relationship with Pakistan.    
 One of the core points in the approach that President Obama put forward was that the 
entire U.S. government and its agencies had to conduct COIN operations alongside each 
other. There would not be significant progress without this type of cooperation. This is the 
“whole of government” approach, which means that the efforts in Afghanistan cannot be won 
without a concerted effort by both the military and civilian government not only on the part of 
the U.S but within the coalition and especially within Afghanistan itself.
63
 The plan for the 
effort in Afghanistan that President Obama initiated was to increase the total number of 
soldiers by 30.000, and conduct a concerted and offensive counterinsurgency while 
maintaining cooperation between the GOA and making sure that Pakistan was being dealt 
with responsibly and with a different stance than what the U.S. government done up to that 
point. Key to this strategy was to treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as one interconnected issue 
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rather than as separate issues only slightly linked together by proximity.
64
 This was the 
starting point for the “renewed” effort in Afghanistan.  
 
2.3 Analysis of the Counterinsurgency Efforts in Kunar and Nuristan 
The provinces of Kunar and Nuristan are located in the East Afghanistan and border the tribal 
areas in Pakistan like most of Regional Command East (RC-East). These are considered some 
of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan and they are some of the most contested areas in 
the country. These are areas where al-Qaeda (AQ) is known to operate, which is unusual in 
most Afghan provinces after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom started in 2001.
65
 AQ 
influence in Afghanistan appears to have been decreased.
66
 Other groups that operate in this 
province are Gulbuddin Hekmatayar’s Hezb-e-Islami (HiG) and the Haqqani network (HQN). 
The two latter are most likely more important than al-Qaeda in terms of COIN analysis 
because of their numbers and the fact that both HiG and HQN are political groups. They are 
motivated by politics and political gain and that involves more than combating American 
interests. These gains are connected to the areas they operate in.
67
 Al-Qaeda is a loosely 
connected global terrorist network which operates differently in connection with the conflict 
in Afghanistan. Both HiG and HQN also have a clear hierarchical structure unlike their 
terrorist counterpart. All these groups operate alongside the Afghan Taliban and even though 
their ultimate goal may be different the unifying factor is U.S and coalition presence in 
Afghanistan and their struggle against the government of Afghanistan.
68
    
 The examination of how the COIN effort is going in these two provinces is presented 
as one common analysis, because they have some similarities regarding the challenges they 
represent for the COIN effort. They have three main similarities in this respect. First, both 
provinces have been one of the main infiltration areas for insurgents from Pakistan’s tribal 
                                               
64 White House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 01-12-2009 
65 Institute for the Study of War, Province Overview: Regional Command East 
http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-east#Kunar (accessed 05-21-2012) 
66 John Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates January 25 2011: p. 8-9  
67 The New York Times, Structure of A Terrorist Network September 24 2011 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/24/world/structure-of-a-terrorist-network.html (accessed 05-28-
2012), Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism February 1 2012 
http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Hizb-iIslami--Gulbuddin-HIG-
Afghanistan.html (accessed 05-28-2012) 
68 Department of Defense, DOD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Campbell via teleconference from Afghanistan 
May 10 2011 http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4821 (accessed 05-21-2012) 
25 
 
areas. Second, because of the high level of insurgent activity, hypothetically it should be 
easier to measure progress because of the difficult operational environment they provide. 
Second, the low level of development of infrastructure in both provinces means that forces 
operating in the area have to have a distinct “hands on” approach, meaning boots on the 
ground. The area requires in many cases that the troops who are conducting 
counterinsurgency have to travel by foot, which means a closer proximity to populations in 
the areas of operation. This becomes significantly more important as U.S forces patrol areas 
closer to the Pakistani border and insurgents can exfiltrate back to the tribal areas of Pakistan 
with impunity. Third, both provinces have a high level of insurgent activity, which provide a 
difficult operational environment for the COIN effort. The different types of difficulties are of 
much the same kind, as will be seen from the analyses in the following sections, using 
different metrics to assess the main aspects of the COIN effort.  
2.3.1 Civilian Casualties and the Location of Fire 
Proximity to local villagers creates a situation where perception is of utmost importance 
especially in an area that is has high activity by insurgent groups. Civilian casualties and 
location of fire fights are the first two metrics that will be used to examine the COIN effort in 
Kunar and Nuristan. To examine this, reports made by the United Nations Assistance Mission 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) will be useful, starting at the end of 2009, and onwards to February 
2012. This will give a demonstration of how these metrics can be used to measure whether the 
strategy for “population centric” COIN is working as it was intended when the new strategy 
for Afghanistan was established in late 2009.       
 The annual report from 2009 indicates that around 10% of all civilian deaths have 
occurred in Eastern Afghanistan. That may not seem like much compared to the South if one 
considers the sparsely populated areas where a lot of the fighting has occurred. 
69
 The report 
states that 2009 has been the worst year on record for the civilian population in Afghanistan 
and the burden and devastation that the conflict is causing is in no way declining. All the 
reports from 2009 to early 2012 make for discouraging reading. There is a steady increase in 
civilian casualties, each year setting a new high for civilian casualties. However, the reasons 
for the increase in civilian casualties are composed and therefore require closer analysis. 
 The troop increase of almost fifty percent in the entire country could be an attributing 
factor to loss of civilian life. More troops on the ground cause the insurgents to adapt their 
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strategy to counter that increase. This may therefore be part of the explanation of the rise in 
civilian casualties. The problem is that this would most likely only explain the casualties 
during the employment of the extra troops. However, this does not seem likely since troop 
levels have been the same or lower now than in 2009-2010.
70
 The Obama administration 
withdrew 10.000 troops by late 2011, and therefore the increase in troop levels cannot alone 
explain the increase in civilian loss of life. The greatest loss of civilian life is attributed to 
insurgent forces, the UNAMA reports do not differentiate between the different groups of 
insurgents or criminal networks. The U.S. and coalition forces operating alone or in 
conjunction with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have a substantially lower rate of 
civilian casualties, because they do not target the population like the insurgent in many cases 
do. However, their presence puts the local villagers at risk and it is because of the “population 
centric” COIN approach that it is necessary to be amongst the villagers. In the latest report 
there is also an indication that the loss of life has increased in Eastern Afghanistan more than 
in any other region compared to earlier figures. 
71
 This illustrates that the figures in these 
reports are indeed useful for the analysis of the COIN effort in these two provinces. 
 Indirect fire is one of the key issues in these reports when it comes to civilian 
casualties. Indirect fire means either ground based artillery or airstrikes from any type of 
aircraft. They are a reoccurring theme in each of the reports, especially in the eastern 
provinces where air strikes cause 61% of all civilian casualties in the areas where there has 
been repeated engagements between ISAF forces and insurgents. 
72
 The reports focus on the 
most deadly incidents but in terms of the COIN doctrine and in the case of these two 
provinces it is not necessarily the number of killed which creates the biggest impact on how 
the effort is evolving. Both Kunar and Nuristan are significantly more sparsely populated than 
other regions. Out of the total population of Afghanistan of over 30 million people, 530.000 
live in these two provinces combined. 
73
 A civilian loss of life in these areas may impact the 
COIN effort in a profound way because they are remote and far from the centralized 
government in Kabul. A death may incite more skepticism in these areas because they are in 
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an area where the insurgent groups have had their strongholds in the East. It is seemingly 
much easier for the insurgent to “prove” to the local population fed up by fighting that the 
insurgent group is the answer rather than a remote government in Kabul that relies on 
foreigners to maintain security. This problem is illustrated by an incident that killed several 
civilians on March 1 2011: “The incident occurred following insurgent rocket attacks on 
[Forward Operating Base] Blessing,” the statement said. “Coalition forces returned fire at the 
assessed point of origin with indirect and aerial fire. Regrettably, there appears to have been 
an error in the hand-off between identifying the location of the insurgents and the attack 
helicopters that carried out subsequent operations.”74 The Taliban in the area wrote in a 
statement about the incident. The Taliban focuses not on the response during a firefight but 
says that it was a malicious attack on the future generations of Afghanistan, and not a firefight 
between two sides of a conflict.
75
 This could be blown off as propaganda but one has to 
consider the impact a statement like this has on the population that experienced it. A death in 
a region that is sparsely populated affects the entire community and has a greater impact on 
the society as a whole. The other side of that may be that the civilians of the region see the 
insurgent group as the party responsible for the incident since it was their rocket attack that 
initiated the response. The perception of the local villagers is a key aspect for the effort. If 
they do not feel safer having patrols of U.S. forces in the area and would rather prefer what 
the situation was like before then that impacts the U.S COIN effort in a severely negative 
way.             
 The location of a firefight seems to be intertwined with civilian casualties, and plays a 
part of the perceived security that the counterinsurgent forces are trying to provide. Again the 
COIN forces are confronted with a double edged sword. On the one hand they have to be 
there in order to actually conduct COIN operations but according to UNAMA reports there is 
inherent risk with establishing either military bases, forward operating bases and combat 
outposts in conjunction with populated areas. It is possible to analyze this difficult situation 
by examining some incidents that has caused civilian casualties. Tribal leaders in Kunar 
claimed that 50 civilians had been killed through fighting between insurgent and coalition 
forces. 
76
 The engagements have happened both when the U.S. forces have been conducting 
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operations as well as by attacks on their bases. The problem here is that not only are the 
insurgent groups targeting the U.S. forces but in doing so they may also inadvertently attack 
the civilians that live in the surrounding area. Specifically insurgent rockets and mortar 
attacks on U.S. bases cause the most harm to civilians as they often are located inside or close 
to civilian populations. 
77
 UNAMA reports suggest that instead of providing security for the 
people around these bases, the bases become threats in themselves because they are prime 
targets for insurgent forces. In particular there is the emphasis on the appropriate use of force 
from the counterinsurgent as a response to an attack. There is a concern in two reports that 
responses from coalition forces do not match the strength of the insurgent attack.
78
 This 
relates to the expression used by John A. Nagl, one has to measure the response to not use a 
“sledgehammer approach,” but rather respond more restrained than one might have done in a 
conventional combat situation.        
 “Conflict-related instability also affects civilian communities by disrupting or blocking 
services such as health, education and humanitarian and development assistance. As conflict 
intensifies, the government and its foreign supporters must enhance activities to meet the needs of 
conflict-affected communities.”79         
 This underlines that though a significantly higher portion of civilian casualties are the 
result of insurgent attacks, the impact that foreign military presence has on the civilian 
community in the area is crucial for the COIN effort. Minimizing the civilian casualties 
cannot be tied only to U.S. forces’ collateral damage. It should also be tied to what kind of 
threat would face a population if a base is put up in close proximity to civilian populations. 
Not only does it affect the de facto threat of being killed, but the instability that comes with 
the arrival of more foreign forces may adversely affect the area. With the increase of troops 
the counterinsurgency effort can experience friction because the population is fearful of 
intensified fighting. This seems to be a core part of the challenges to the COIN effort in Kunar 
and Nuristan. Because of the sparse population, lack of roads and basic infrastructure the 
proximity to civilian populations need to be closer. One has to consider the effect of foreign 
presence and level of insurgent attacks that the community may experience.   
 For these reasons communication is a key aspect when dealing with civilian casualties. 
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The communication in Afghanistan is to a great extent based on word of mouth and radio; 
therefore it is important for coalition forces to be aware of this while conducting operations in 
the field.
80
 Particular importance is put on the need to be first with information. It is an 
imperative to beat the insurgent’s media capabilities as it is often not as developed as the U.S 
forces’ ability to conduct information operations, so that the “correct” truth is the one that 
spreads through the communities. When conducting COIN operations it is necessary obtain 
the populations support otherwise it is impossible to root out the insurgents. Because of this 
the truth about an incident where there have been civilian casualties and the counterinsurgent 
has been involved, has to be presented and communicated in a way that can counter other 
media outlets perception of that situation.
81
 This does not mean feeding the population with 
propaganda; rather the presentation has to both match what happened and to stand up against 
other claims, specifically those made by insurgent “media” or other outlets that seek to disrupt 
public confidence.  
2.3.2 IED Reporting and Incidents 
Improvised explosive devices (IED) account for the majority of civilian casualties in 
Afghanistan and the reporting and incidents based on the use of this tactic is an important 
metric for assessing the COIN effort evolution in Kunar and Nuristan. The ability to report 
IED’s and willingness to assist U.S. forces in disarming and removing these bombs illustrates 
that the local population feels safe enough to work against the insurgents. It also illustrates the 
level of trust the civilian population has in the ISAF force’s ability to keep them safe after the 
devices have been removed. More specifically, they trust  that the counterinsurgent forces 
are able to secure the area so insurgent cannot return later and punish the people who have 
cooperated with the U.S forces. Because of the significant amount of civilian casualties that 
IED’s produce throughout Afghanistan, reporting also indicates whether the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) are able to control areas where they have been given command. 
Insurgents target Afghans in the security forces as they see them as traitors to the cause and 
the country. They often refer to the security forces personnel as “puppets.”82 Therefore the 
ability to conduct their own security operations and combating the spread of IED’s is an 
aspect of the counterinsurgency that indicates that the local population has faith in the 
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Government of Afghanistan and, perhaps more importantly that they have faith that local 
Afghan security forces are not corrupt and supportive of the insurgents.  
 Examining the monthly trends that ISAF have published from September 2011 to May 
2012 gives an updated image on how the different aspects listed above comes into play when 
analyzing the COIN effort. The reports show that Regional Command East (RC-East) has the 
most enemy initiated attacks, that means the insurgents initiates the engagement, firing first or 
detonating IED’s directed at the U.S and ANSF forces.83 From late 2011 there is an increase 
in overall attacks in Afghanistan and about 39 percent of all the violence in Afghanistan 
occurs in RC-East, with a significant amount in Kunar and Nuristan.
84
 It would appear from 
the statistics that because of the extremely harsh winter experienced in 2011 the level of 
insurgent activity has been lower than in previous years and this may explain the decrease in 
attacks. In terms of IED reporting the interest is in generally low, it would appear, especially 
in contested areas where the risk of retaliatory attacks from insurgents outweighs the local 
populations’ inclination to report an IED. This is regardless of the fact that the highest number 
of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and in RC-East is attributed to insurgent’s mines and 
indiscriminate use of IED’s.85 It would seem that in terms of collaboration on work against 
the use of improvised explosive devices there is much that needs to be done. The statistics 
that ISAF has released on their website indicate a stagnation of progress throughout this 
period. Against this background, if the COIN strategy was working as intended one should 
expect to see an increase in reporting since the use of IEDs presents one of the most 
significant threats to the civilian population.      
 A report from the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows that the 
overall turn in rate, meaning the number of IED’s that civilians report are stable and low. In 
total for the whole of 2009 and 2010 there were 365 IEDs that had been turned in by the local 
population. 
86
 These are numbers for the whole country of Afghanistan and they indicate a 
fairly low turn in rate. However, the numbers from the ISAF Monthly trends which are 
updated monthly indicate a larger number, and it is possible to assert that numbers that the 
CSIS report indicates does not take into account what the ISAF reports do. In what seems to 
be a rising trend, the number of IED’s found and cleared has increased after the CSIS report 
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put forward its findings. The report on monthly progress from ISAF shows that a large 
percentage of IED’s have been discovered and disposed of, this includes the ones that are 
turned in. One could argue that the report made by CSIS does not take into account that 
civilians may have reported an IED and in so doing assisted the coalition forces in removing 
it. In the report on IED’s it would seem that it counts the number of instances where the 
civilian population itself has physically brought in IED’s. The reason for this interpretation is 
the discrepancy between the numbers that are shown in the IED report compared to that of the 
Monthly Trends released by the coalition forces. It seems unlikely that the number should 
increase almost fifty percent from mid-2010 to mid-2012.
87
 This is unlikely because the report 
from CSIS indicates a stable level of turn in over a period of three years and if that was the 
case it does not seem likely that a breakthrough would happen in the course of a few 
months.
88
           
 Also, the level of turn in, in Kunar would appear to be higher than in Nuristan. Kunar 
has a significantly higher threat level than Nuristan. The number of casualties in Kunar is four 
times higher than in any of the other provinces. That indicates that the insurgent effort is more 
focused in Kunar than in Nuristan. This could be the reason why one can see a higher number 
of reporting in this area rather than in Nuristan. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
focus by U.S troops has been on Kunar rather than Nuristan and this may explain the lower 
level of reporting in that province. A higher number of U.S forces would create a higher level 
of IED incidents, which all of the reports indicate.
 89
      
 To consider the evolution of COIN with respect to IED reporting in Nuristan and 
Kunar the development seems to have reached what could be described as a ceiling. It is 
probably neither as bleak as the CSIS report would indicate and nor positive as the ISAF 
reports. With regard to the operational updates that ISAF posts on their websites it is 
seemingly mostly positive and from that it is possible to make to qualified guesses as to how 
the COIN effort is going. The number of incidents has in terms of events and casualties been 
high. This can be seen both from the UNAMA reports on civilian casualties as well as from 
the ISAF reports on the monthly trends in each regional command. The level of IED reporting 
based on the local population’s willingness to assist is not necessarily low when examined 
along with other factors. The trust between the counterinsurgents in the area as well as the 
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trust in local security forces impacts the level of reporting. This is an issue that makes this 
metric difficult to narrow and give an exact number to examine. Rather it is far more useful to 
see the level of “turn in” that the CSIS report contains in light of the ISAF reports, which 
seem to be more positive than it would appear at first glance. IED reporting is connected to a 
larger set of factors, and among those the communication with the local people is of great 
importance.            
 More specifically, to counter IED’s and specifically the placing of these explosives, a 
key aspect is to maintain the ability to communicate efficiently with the local population. A 
large number of the articles in COIN: Common Sense focus on how to communicate with the 
people in the provinces in a way that provides a two way street of information. If the local 
population provides information the U.S forces must be able through dialog and action to 
show that they are capable of removing threats from the area. This is particularly important 
with regard to IED’s which seems to have some positive trends, as more than 50% of them are 
neutralized, compared to 45% in 2011 which according to both ISAF and CSIS show a 
negative trend from 2008.
90
 In all the statistics on IED attacks the fluctuation of a few percent 
up and down does not indicate that the insurgents’ ability to use IED’s as their primary 
weapon is diminishing, but rather it seems to have stagnated and has stopped at a 
unacceptably high level throughout the beginning of the Obama administrations new strategy 
and till today. This could indicate that the COIN effort in terms of the neutralization of IED’s 
and cooperating with the local population in this regard is not going as well as one could 
expect even with an increased number of forces conducting operations.  
2.3.3 Use of Nongovernmental Agencies and Officials’ Safety 
In rural areas in Afghanistan like Kunar and Nuristan the presence of the government of 
Afghanistan is limited and the safety of their officials varies from district to district within the 
province. The insurgent groups are not one group, called the Taliban. There is a multitude of 
different groups who operate in these provinces. These groups range from actual Taliban to 
insurgent groups from Pakistan to criminal groups. The multifaceted insurgent or enemy 
terrain makes it difficult for the government of Afghanistan to track what event can be 
connected to whom.
91
 Within this maze of who is who the Afghan people are placed firmly in 
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the middle. This is a core issue for the COIN effort, and to the people in Afghanistan 
specifically those who live in rural areas like Kunar and Nuristan. The biggest complaint 
forwarded to the coalition is lack of trust in the government of Afghanistan. This is because of 
two reasons which are equally important. First, many rural villagers either in Nuristan or in 
Kunar have not been in actual contact with their official governors or other government 
official in a significant amount of time.
92
 Second, the level of corruption that is more or less 
rampant in large parts of the Government of Afghanistan’s system, specifically the legal 
system, makes the average rural Afghan villager wary of a government that produces few 
results and is virtually nonexistent in remote provinces.
93
 The problem for the 
counterinsurgency effort is the lack of government courts and the populations who refrain 
from using the courts created by the Afghan government. Several different sources, from 
newspapers, government papers to reports from the field all indicate that the population in 
remote provinces tends to prefer Taliban courts and their mobile services rather than turning 
to a government of Afghanistan official.       
 Interviews with local populations also support these indications.
94
 Some villagers 
point to the fact that their experience of Taliban courts is far better than with the government, 
which says a lot about their faith in the government. There is a significant difference in the 
negative aspects of to the two co-existing legal systems. The Taliban courts have become 
appear to be a fair system, or it is considered fairer than the government system. However, 
their main selling point toward the population is the speed and availability that they provide. 
The side that the Taliban would like to hide is the violent side to their shadow government. 
Remote provinces where the coalition forces have less influence show signs that as soon as 
the foreign troops leave the Taliban come out of their hiding place and resume their activities. 
The effectiveness of the shadow government is to a large extent based on their ability to 
monopolize the use of violence in many provinces.
95
 This monopolization of the use of 
violence not only delegitimizes the centralized government in Kabul, but also supports the 
claims made by insurgents that once the coalition troops leave there will be no government to 
speak of and the Taliban will continue to govern the provinces. This counts especially in those 
provinces which border the FATA and NWFP where the government has had a low level of 
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influence throughout history. They appear to provide a far swifter and harsher punishment of 
crimes than the government of Afghanistan. They also use coercion to force people to use the 
shadow courts system, something which the government in Kabul have little understanding of 
because of the large foreign force presence. If the choice is between taking your case up with 
the local Taliban commander or judge and being killed or severely beaten for interacting with 
the U.S. forces then the choice seems somewhat obvious.
96
     
 In an assessment made by the U.S government there are several charts that illustrate 
what kind of relationship that the population of a given Afghan province has towards the 
government and the insurgents. In both Kunar and Nuristan, a majority of areas are at least in 
part sympathetic to the insurgents. Some areas are almost completely in support of the 
insurgency rather than the government in Kabul, and a majority is on the fence.
97
 The 
problem for the centralized judiciary is in certain respects similar to that of the problem with 
civilian casualties, because the areas are so remote and far from the government that 
transaction time is high. This would not have been a problem if there was a consensus that the 
government in Kabul is legitimate, but when it is constantly being faced with charges of 
corruption this creates another layer of mistrust between the local populations and the 
government institutions. The Taliban courts in these areas are in many respects not a better 
option in terms of democratic values but according to villagers in these provinces, results are 
more important than ideas: “If he was honest, I would accept a Sikh from India as my 
governor.”98           
 Quotations like this indicate that the concrete results matter more than the general 
politics whether it is local, tribal or provincial. It appears that people want the court to work, 
but they see the corruption and inefficiency of the Government of Afghanistan as the largest 
hurdle to overcome. This is most likely the reason why the shadow government of the Taliban 
is achieving a foothold that seems to, in rural provinces, to become stronger. An aspect of this 
may also be that people are beginning to hedge their bets. This means that most are aware of 
the time limit set on the major military operations and because of this the Taliban and other 
insurgent groups are able to coerce population in these provinces that they are the only viable 
alternative. The government of Afghanistan is seen as being in quite a dependent relationship 
with the U.S. and therefore has not been able to secure the country. Many think the 
                                               
96 Stefanie Nijssen The Taliban’s Shadow Government in Afghanistan September 2011: p. 4 
97 Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability 
in Afghanistan April 2010: p. 35-37 
98 Griff Witte, Taliban Shadow Officials Offer Concrete Alternative December 8 2009: p. 3 
35 
 
government is most likely going to become more corrupt in the coming years as the 
international security forces leave the responsibility to their Afghan counterparts. Thus, the 
Afghan government does not enjoy much confidence from the populations in the provinces. 
Specifically, the Afghan National Army in terms of perceptions on corruption.
99
  
 The safety of the Government of Afghanistan official’s impacts heavily the ability of 
the government to move within a province. The term official does not mean only high ranking 
government officials but also others representing the government such as ANA and ANP 
personnel. There has been a decline in their safety and it has been made clear that it does not 
matter how high ranking one has when it comes to the insurgent threat to official’s safety. The 
assassinations of Karzai’s brother and the averted attack on Kunar’s governor in mid-2011 are 
indicators that this perception is valid.
100
 According to recent numbers published by the 
Brookings Institution there are per month on average five or more assassinations registered in 
most provinces, in some areas the level is higher.
101
 The safety situation is also affected by 
unreported incidents of insurgent attacks on civilians who have cooperated with the ISAF 
forces. The inability for government officials to visit the provinces which they have assumed 
responsibility for feeds into the lack of trust in the government as a whole. Unwillingness to 
put themselves at risk makes this problem worse. According to local officials in Nuristan, the 
governor of the province was most often in Kabul or Jalalabad  rather than being in the 
province that he was supposed to govern. The local official complained that when he was in 
the province he would not venture outside of the secure provincial governors compound.
102
 
When McChrystal issued his Commander’s Summary, he specifically stated the importance of 
aiding the Government of Afghanistan in increasing the level of confidence in the government 
among Afghans.
103
 This example of a governor who is barely present and who refuses to 
leave his compound illustrate that not only has the security environment been impeded but 
also that the will of those who govern is weakened by the threat that the insurgents pose. It 
has been a core part of the U.S strategy to build the government of Afghanistan by having a 
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credible centralized government in Kabul which can responsibly govern provinces with local 
governors. These examples of court use and official safety show that the progress of COIN in 
these two provinces seem to be progressing in a one step forward two steps back fashion.  
 
2.4 Analysis of the Counterinsurgency Efforts in Nangarhar 
The province of Nangarhar differs from the other two provinces as it contains a vast level of 
natural resources, has a major urban hub, Jalalabad, and is considered a vital province 
economically in Afghanistan because of its trade link with Pakistan through the trade route 
that connects Peshawar with Kabul. The city of Jalalabad also has an airport increasing its 
strategic significance in the region.
104
 Compared to both Nuristan and Kunar this province has 
a lower number of attacks initiated by the enemy. It also has a lower number of IED attacks; 
however this seems to be changing indicating a negative trend in the province.
105
 The 
escalating violence also in Nangarhar can be attributed to the increase in foreign troops and an 
increase in their operations. This has created targeting areas which have been not been 
targeted earlier. Another difference between Nangarhar and the other two provinces is that 
Nangarhar appears to have been more secure in the years before the implementation of the 
new strategy. There is no univocal way to interpret this difference with regard to the COIN 
effort. It might signify a positive trend for the COIN operations forcing the insurgents to 
attack with a greater strength and with a different strategy than the insurgents had to deal with 
earlier, before the increased level of resistance by U.S. forces. The increase in troops seems to 
have caused a greater level of success in removing the insurgents from the population base 
which the insurgents need to be effective.        
 A general problem in all these three provinces is the proximity to Pakistan’s tribal 
areas, which serve as a sanctuary for a large number of fighters, not only insurgents but also 
terrorist organizations. A report published in Military Review paints a picture of IED attacks 
having become an increasing trend in Nangarhar during the last few years compared to 2006-
2008.
106
 These attacks were possibly caused by the increase of troops in the region from 2011. 
The levels of troops are dropping now that the withdrawal has been set for 2014, but IED 
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attacks remain fairly constant. This is where the problem of interpretation arises. If the 
increased insurgent activity in the area is caused by the insurgent’s awareness of the 
impending hand over of responsibility to the Afghan security forces, this may be a show of 
force on the part of the insurgents. It may be interpreted as an attempt to underline the 
strength they still have. April 20xy by insurgent forces in several provinces supports this 
interpretation.
107
 If this is the case it could indicate that instead of reaping the success of 
earlier progress, Nangarhar may see a decline in security just as Kunar and Nuristan have seen 
following the withdrawal of U.S. forces.      
 Civilian reporting of IED’s in Nangarhar has been low compared to the number found 
by the ISAF forces. The level of operations against the insurgents who plant or create IEDs, 
however, seems to have been stable at least if one looks at the rate of seizures made by 
coalition and Afghan security forces in May and June of this year in Nangarhar.
108
 This could 
indicate that the population in the province is interested and most of all willing to aid in the 
apprehension of individuals that pose a threat to their community. This is important to 
establishing security and therefore this could be interpreted as a sign of will to support the 
COIN effort even though general the security may have become worse.   
 In both Kunar and Nuristan there seems to be a mood of discouragement that is more 
strongly felt than what appears to be the case in Nangarhar. This may be because the 
counterinsurgency effort is more focused in Nangarhar than it seems to be in the other two 
provinces. The reason for this may be twofold. First, Nangarhar has by any measure a much 
higher level of developed infrastructure, especially around Jalalabad and the surrounding 
areas compared to the two other provinces.
109
 Second, because it houses one of Afghanistan’s 
important agricultural regions, Nangarhar has more “potential” for development than 
provinces like Kunar and Nuristan. This is not to say that it is not important to establish 
infrastructure in the more rural areas that are a significantly less developed. The point is the 
agricultural area’s importance to the region in terms of possible production of value for the 
region as a whole, and this could be a stepping stone towards achieving progress that could 
spread.           
 The further development of infrastructure in Nangarhar has been one of the core parts 
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of the COIN effort there, and it appears to have been working better in this province than in 
the other two. Two separate reports describe agricultural efforts and road building projects 
that have been very successful. Nangarhar Inc., a program that was creating sustainable 
“quick-impact” projects in the province, was aimed at strengthening economic growth and 
enabling export of the vast agricultural resources to other areas.
110
 “Quick-impact” means 
projects that have a fairly short time line in terms of construction or implementation but with 
outcomes that make a difference in the region they are enacted. These projects may range 
from well building to road improvement.
111
 Though road construction could arguably be 
considered long term because of a longer timeline its effects in Nangarhar have illustrated the 
effectiveness of rebuilding infrastructure and quick impact projects. This was demonstrated 
by the Nangarhar Inc. program. The projects created opportunities for the local population 
and provided an avenue of work and income that had not been possible before.
112
 The focus 
that this program has had on interagency work and its ability to combine American forces 
with their Afghan counterparts in a successful manner seemed to be a core part of the project. 
Such ability of foreign troops to partner with Afghan counterparts is important because of the 
mentoring aspect as well as local ownership towards projects. This was a significant aspect of 
the success of Nangarhar Inc., which did not only consist of quick impact projects but also 
counternarcotics operations and job creation outside of the agricultural sector.
113
  
 In partnering with Afghan counterparts, whether they are military or civilian officials, 
the U.S army has emphasized the importance of maintaining a level of cooperation which 
does not emasculate their counterparts, making sure that what is taught does not come off as a 
parent teaching a child. Instead they focus on planning and execution of projects that are led 
by Afghans. The ability to let Afghans lead and to trust that through cooperation they are able 
to execute the intended plan has a twofold benefit for the relationship with the COIN effort 
and the local population.
114
 It demonstrates that the U.S forces are able to provide the 
assistance needed to complete projects and it demonstrates their ability and understanding of 
working with their Afghan counterpart. Perhaps most importantly, the Afghan partners show 
the local population that the government can perform its duties towards the people. Showing 
progress in terms of both planning and execution demonstrates viable results to the people. It 
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seems that problems in this respect have been one of the major issues not only in Nangarhar 
but also in Kunar and Nuristan. Though projects have been started and indeed followed 
through in the two other provinces they seem to be hampered mostly by lack of ability to 
continue progression once it has passed its starting stages: “Based on experience, it is not 
enough to do all of this hard work in the beginning, the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams) also must follow up as the project develops.”115 This has been a more difficult issue in 
Kunar and Nuristan because of lack of access to certain areas, specifically the border area 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is also a problem that the level of enemy contacts has 
been higher in these provinces than in Nangarhar, as seen in the reports published by ISAF on 
the attacks in the region. Michelle Parker, who wrote Case Studies for National Security 
Transformation, argues that the very process towards creating a “product” is as important as 
the projects outcome. She emphasizes that this approach includes the Government of 
Afghanistan in the project from its starting phase, which is key to training the officials for the 
time when the foreign troops leave. Another key aspect of this is the unwillingness of local 
populations to not harbor the insurgents who try to weaken the government.
116
   
 As part of creating a secure environment a program for creating a peace center which 
focuses on reintegration of insurgent fighters and former Taliban was launched. In terms of 
security the effect of this type of center might be the ability to provide an out for people who 
are tired or unwilling to fight. Providing these individuals with another option helps create 
trust between fighters and the Afghan government. It shows them that the government is 
serious about trying to create a more stable and secure Afghanistan. The program has been 
delayed because insurgents murdered the head of the program, illustrating that isolated 
operations can have devastating effects on ongoing process.
117
     
 The reintegration effort is hoped to spread to Nuristan and Kunar as well, underlining 
the importance of Nangarhar in a regional setting. However, the paradox is that even if it goes 
well in Nangarhar there is no indication at this point that this is spreading to the other two 
provinces in question. Partly this may be because the main focus in the other two provinces is 
to rebuild what little infrastructure exists as well as maintaining a minimum of safety for the 
civilian population. This is arguably one of the biggest differences between Nangarhar and 
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Kunar and Nuristan. The ability to conduct missions, plan and execute rebuilding efforts as 
well as enabling Afghan officials to assume leading roles on projects seems possible in 
Nangarhar because of the existing conditions that had developed before the Obama 
administration’s new strategy.        
 When it comes to the shadow government, Nangarhar has the same problem that has 
been observed earlier in the other two provinces. It does, however, have a slight twist. While 
the insurgents have established a de facto shadow government in the rural parts of all three 
provinces exists because there is little alternative, the more urbanized and developed areas in 
Nangarhar seems to be more affected by malign influences rather than direct control.
118
 
Malign influences mean any subversive actions, direct or indirect, that affect the COIN effort. 
In the case of Nangarhar the use of nongovernmental agents seems to exist side by side with 
the Government of Afghanistan. It does not necessarily mean that the use is always 
destructive. The people are accustomed to settling disputes with what could be considered a 
“local ad-hoc” council that resolves disputes and conflicts particular to the area or the persons 
involved.
119
 This means that in order to achieve a successful use of turning to the official 
judicial system it seems that there is needed a change in the mindset of the civilian 
population, which is to say the least a monumental task. It might therefore be that the most 
logical way to forward the progression of COIN in Nangarhar is to incorporate the local 
traditional customs alongside the official judiciary. This may not be viable immediately but 
there is a need to combat corruption which is prevalent in every province of Afghanistan. This 
is a major issue for the civilian populations trust in the government’s ability to actually 
sustain a centralized government in Kabul.        
 Shadow courts operate in Nangarhar in a fashion similar to that of the other provinces 
but with more of a backseat it would appear. The insurgents seek to subvert the government 
of Afghanistan by affecting the decisions made in local “ad-hoc” dispute resolution processes. 
Even though they are not at as open about it in Nangarhar as they may be in Kunar and 
Nuristan it is still an influence that needs to be reversed. A general problem is corruption with 
officials. That is still one of the major concerns with having whole projects being left over to 
Afghan leadership. It can very quickly turn into a “what benefits me benefits you” type of 
relationship with power brokers in that specific area. Jadedness towards that situation is one 
of the main issues facing the COIN effort as a whole because it so severely affects the faith 
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the civilian population has towards the Government in Kabul.
120
 Combating the lack of belief 
in change through working with the government is no less important in Nangarhar than it is in 
the other two provinces. The main difference is that the development of infrastructure in 
Nangarhar seems to be far stronger and security is better. That the security situation is better 
does not equate to peaceful. A search in Google on “Nangarhar” and “attacks” yields several 
results, which show that the last few months there have been several major attacks made by 
the insurgents, all causing a significant amount of civilian casualties.
121
 These casualties, 
though not created by ISAF, forces hamper the effort because of the uncertainty that they 
create. If one is not safe in areas that have a heavy foreign force presence, then arguing with 
villagers in more remote rural areas that it is safe to cooperate with the government is a tough 
sell.           
 Nevertheless, the development in Nangarhar very clearly demonstrates the general 
point that the insurgents have a weakness in their inability to create infrastructure, the Taliban 
or any other insurgent group has very little capability to create more jobs or execute projects 
that enhances the living conditions of the civilian population. Arguably this is the strongest 
card the U.S. and Afghan forces have on their side. This is important because the insurgent 
cannot win an all-out battle with the coalition troops but it can once the foreign forces leave 
combat on more equal terms with the ANSF because ANSF lack the military power and 
prowess of American military forces. The insurgents are therefore reliant on undermining the 
Government in Afghanistan before they have been able to successfully complete projects, 
since such projects make the civilian population less inclined to support the insurgency.  
  
To sum up: as seen from the analyses presented in this chapter, none of the metrics applied to 
measure the various aspects of the COIN operations provide univocal indications on to what 
extent the implementation of the COIN strategy so far may be regarded a success or not. This 
goes both for what, in chapter one, is referred to as the military aspects and the civilian 
aspects of COIN. The main metrics for assessing the military aspects have been related to the 
various kinds of civilian casualties and the location of firefights or enemy engagements. In 
principle the impact of civilian casualties should be the most easy, or least difficult, to 
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measure of these two metrics, since it can be measured by numbers. Regardless of the fact 
that there also are some difficulties in providing and analyzing the numbers, it seems to be an 
established fact that the total number of civilian casualties have been slightly increasing 
during the years of the implementation of the COIN strategy. A somewhat more contested 
fact is that the number of civilian casualties caused by insurgents is higher than the number 
caused by the ISAF forces and the Afghan government forces.    
 However, as we have seen, the consequence of this is not a question of simple 
numbers. The local population’s interpretation and understanding of what transpired and what 
was the real cause in each case event where civilian casualties are experienced, are also very 
important The perception of the local population regarding the causes in each case is of 
crucial importance for whether to trust the insurgents that operating in an area or to trust the 
representatives for the Afghan government or the ISAF forces that are operating in the same 
area.             
 This is also why the location of firefights represents one of the crucial aspects of the 
COIN effort. Both these kinds of events are on the one hand events that takes place within a 
bigger picture, and on the other hand they are composed of elements and incidents that in 
themselves are not easy to interpret what were the real causes for what has happened. 
Therefore, to establish/have a relation to the local people that makes it possible to 
communicate with them in each particular case is therefore an integral part of the COIN effort 
and overall strategy. The preceding analysis shows that to what extent the COIN effort have 
made progress in this part of its strategy, is not really possible to say. What is possible to say 
on the basis of the analysis, is that any progress in this field is very vulnerable. It may at any 
time be followed by a new setback, due to a new event or incident, whether caused by the 
event as such or by the way it is interpreted and perceived by the local population.  
 The application of parameters for examining what could be considered the more 
civilian aspects of the COIN effort, IED reporting, Afghan government officials’ safety in the 
provinces and the use of insurgents courts vs. the use of government courts to solve local 
disputes, neither did provide any univocal picture. Except for the various methods for 
mapping the numbers of IED reporting, all these metrics are to be measured by rather 
qualitative methods, and the overall judgment has to be made on the basis of systematic 
thinking about a number of cases rather than systematic registration of all cases. As we have 
seen from the preceding analysis, a systematic review of reports from all three fields of 
activities signs of both setbacks and progress. The supposed importance of these fields of 
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activities for the realization of the COIN strategy may be said to have been confirmed by the 
experiences made, but the level of success is more difficult to determine. If a general 
conclusion were to be drawn it might be that in all these three fields the results obtained seem 
to be lower than what was expected, but it has to be left an open question whether the 
expectations may have been too high.        
 When compared to the analyses of Kunar and Nuristan, the analysis of the COIN 
effort in Nangarhar may shed light on the question whether the expectations to the results 
from the COIN effort have been set too high,. Some of the differences between Nangarhar and 
the two other provinces, such as the lower number of attacks by the enemy and the lower 
number of IED attacks in Nangarhar, appear not to be consequences of the COIN effort but of 
the different economic and social conditions that were there from the beginning. Nangarhar 
has both better economic conditions for development and a better infrastructure that may 
enhance further development.         
 These conditions obviously are also good preconditions for realizing those aspects of 
the COIN effort that consist of engaging in development projects in the province, such as 
further improvement of the infrastructure. The result from these kinds of projects in 
Nangarhar have demonstrated that a weak point for the insurgents in the long run is their lack 
of ability and resources to create and improve the infrastructure in the areas they operate. The 
ISAF forces and Afghan forces therefore have a “competitive advantage,” regarding the 
possibilities to create trust and support from the population in the provinces they operate. In 
other words, the experiences from building infrastructure in Nangarhar have demonstrated 
that this is a very important part of the COIN strategy. On the other hand, this also begs the 
question whether the conditions in Kunar and Nuristan for realizing this crucial aspect of 
COIN have been present at all.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3 Cultural Understanding and Its Importance for COIN Operations 
Culture is a word that carries a lot of different meanings, and in today’s military operations, it 
appears to have become more important than one would have thought. The counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan has to take culture into account, and whether or not the military 
conducting the operations see culture as an important aspect.  To be able to conduct COIN 
operations in Afghanistan, foreign forces have to know how they should react to the people 
who live there, what they can do, what they should not do. “Human terrain” is an important 
concept within the COIN doctrine that emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
culture where the COIN operations are being conducted.
122
 One could argue that in 
Afghanistan there are several levels and layers of culture, each one specific to certain aspects 
of the society there. It could be anything from political culture to a specific set of social codes 
that only exist in one village. With that in mind, there is little wonder that the task of 
conducting counterinsurgency in a country like Afghanistan is a difficult task. The 
commander’s assessment created at the beginning of the Obama administration’s first 
“refocus” on Afghanistan is a testament to the importance of being aware of the operational 
environment.
123
 General McChrystal, then commander for operations in Afghanistan, outlines 
in this document the importance of understanding the problems related to facing the Afghan 
people and emphasizes the importance that a campaign has to take this into account.
124
   
 For the purpose of argument, it is necessary to divide the different layers in Afghan 
society in some respect because they appear to be more diverse than one would find in 
Western cultures. The top layer is the country itself, regardless of national unity. It is the 
landmass that the people in the area of operations reside in. The second layer is the provinces, 
which in this case, are Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar. The third layer is the cities and 
villages within the provinces. The fourth is the ethnic and tribal ties within these villages and 
cities. The fourth level is arguably one with the most diverse and important aspects and is the 
most challenging to COIN operations. If the COIN operations fail on the most basic level, 
meaning inside the villages and cities, the operations that seek to create stability would likely 
not spread further. That level is arguably the most important because it is the foundation for 
                                               
122 United States, United States Army The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 
2006: section: 3-16 
123 International Security and Assistance Force, Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment 30 August 
2009: 1-1, 1-2  
124 Ibid. 1-1, 1-2, 1-15, 1-16, 2-2, 2-3 
46 
 
confidence among the population. Therefore, the knowledge of culture is not only important 
for the people and the counterinsurgent, but it is important to the whole operation because of 
the need to be very local and national at the same time.      
 Cultural goals are usually divided into strategic and tactical.
125
 The strategic level has 
more to do with history and how certain events or actions are perceived. This could be on the 
national level, as well as on a smaller level like a district. The tactical cultural understanding 
means the knowledge necessary to conduct operations in any given area of operations. That is, 
the understanding needed on the part of the counterinsurgent to responsibly assess and deal 
with the local conditions that make up the “human terrain” that foreign troops face on the 
ground.
126
 Those challenges could be simple disputes inside a village or dealing with 
reparations for collateral damages caused by bombings. Against this background, this chapter 
will discuss the three main ways in which cultural understanding is of great importance when 
conducting COIN operations. These are: First, the effort to reintegrate and reconcile fighters 
that have opposed the sitting government and the security forces; Second, the relationship 
between the Western conception of democracy and Afghan political culture, especially the 
tension between central and local government; Third, the last part of the cultural analysis will 
concentrate on religion, as well as the importance and possible effects of misinterpreting the 
importance of religion on the interplay between Pakistan’s tribal agencies and the three 
provinces. The issues that face U.S.’ efforts and Pakistan relations to the three provinces, in 
terms of culture, will also be a part of that analysis.      
     
3.1 Reintegration and the Need for Cultural Understanding  
The reintegration of insurgent fighters is an issue that is possibly more important today than it 
may have been when the insurgency got its new wind around 2006. The reason for this is that 
the date for withdrawal has been set, and this has given the insurgents a timeline of when 
most major combat troops will be pulled out of the country. Though the Obama 
administration has used the word “responsible draw down,” it would seem that it is driven 
more by lack of public and political will than an acceptable security situation in Afghanistan. 
With that in mind, the need to be able to conduct successful reintegration of insurgent 
fighters, whether they are ad hoc fighters or seriously ideologically driven, insurgents are 
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paramount.
127
 Without successful reintegration of fighters and population that have been 
active in supporting insurgents, there seems to be little possible hope for a reasonably stable 
security environment when the main foreign force leaves Afghanistan.   
 After the defeat of the Russian forces in the late 1980s, the lack of reintegration of 
fighters is a reminder of the importance of having a strategy for how to deal with that 
particular issue. Though the Russian invasion of Afghanistan had a more definite end point 
than what can be expected with the 2014 withdrawal, the issue is no less critical now than it 
was at the time of the Russian withdrawal. “Most Afghan insurgents are fighting near their 
communities and only a minority is ideologically driven; most fight because of grievances, 
often local in origin.”128 This quote illustrates the importance of understanding local 
grievances, and to be able to assist in the reintegration process, the foreign security forces 
have to be able to aid the insurgents willing to be reintegrated in the process. In this process, 
local mentoring and understanding of local customs, whether they are with a local “Jirga” 
(Jirga is an Afghan assembly of village elders, religious scholars, and local officials who have 
come together to resolve grievances) or with government officials in a government facility, 
are important because it represents an Afghan solution to an Afghan problem.
129
  
 The Afghan Peace, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Program (APRP) has been 
created to make the process of reintegration an Afghan project.
130
 The program seeks to 
reintegrate the insurgent fighters that wish to rejoin their communities in a way that is 
responsible and beneficial to both parties, the fighter and the community that he wishes to 
rejoin. The APRP is a nationally organized program with affiliate offices in different 
regions.
131
  It is an Afghan program, because of the people who lead it have a relatively good 
understanding of local issues and have established access to the local communities. Thus, the 
program addresses both strategic goals with reintegration nationally and locally in regions 
and/or villages. The tactical aspect is applied in each village or city based on their specific 
needs. In doing that, the program applies local solutions to local problems, rather than being 
centrally controlled from headquarters in Kabul by people who may have little experience 
with the specific regions. However, with regard to local conditions, it is important that the 
foreign forces are able to mentor the people who are actually key figures in that environment. 
If foreign forces disregard the importance of understanding the local power structures, that 
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would in turn, defeat the purpose of mentoring. If the “wrong” people were helped, it would 
send a message of incompetence to the population on the part of security forces and also 
illustrate that the security forces have little to no cultural knowledge about the people they are 
trying to help.           
 The idea of honor and retribution is an important part of the Pashtu culture. Those 
ideas fall under what is known as “Pashtunwali,” the Pashtu code of conduct.132 Kunar and 
Nangarhar provinces are close to 90 percent Pashtun.
133
 Nuristan, on the other hand, is 
composed of Nuristanis, which belong to a different ethnic group than the Pashtuns. This 
group resides only in Nuristan and the northern part of Kunar.
134
 They have several separate 
languages and have been known to be antipathetic, both to the Taliban and U.S. forces.
135
 It 
would seem that this ethnic group sees itself as more independent than the Pashtu who appear 
to be more positive towards centralized government. This also could, however, be because the 
Pashtun ethnic group is, in fact, represented in the government, which the Nuristanis are 
not.
136
 Nuristanis have also had a history of being on the outside of the Afghan state.
137
 The 
Nuristanis have been alienated for a long time and, as a result, it is likely that they are more 
skeptical to the stability effort. The fact that the province of Nuristan has been left on the 
sidelines in the COIN effort is likely to solidify the reservations this group has towards the 
Government of Afghanistan.
138
 Most of the materials on reintegration and reconciliation for 
the tactical level are written with Pashtun culture in mind. The Nuristani culture will therefore 
be commented on only where it differs from Pashtun culture.     
 The concept of retribution is important in Pashtunwali. If a wrong has been 
committed, the guidelines for retribution (“badal”) must be followed to allow that act to be 
rectified or punished.
139
 It is not difficult to see that this may pose a significant issue to the 
process of reintegration, and especially if insurgents have hurt the community severely or hurt 
power structures that are still in control of the area alongside government officials. It could 
also be that the insurgents belong to a different tribe than the ruling tribe in any given area, 
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and that they are therefore subjected to a harsher “badal” than what the person otherwise 
would have received.  
  The news magazines COIN: Common Sense and Freedom Watch both discuss and 
emphasize the importance of letting Afghans take lead in the effort, especially the importance 
of having local leaders oversee as much of the process as possible to allow for a good 
integration process back into the community.
140
 For COIN operations, this would appear to be 
a win-win situation if handled correctly. First, one of the main objectives within the COIN 
doctrine is to separate the insurgent from the population that he is using to hide within.
141
 
Reintegrating fighters into their communities removes them not only from the insurgent 
group, but can also be a part of getting other insurgents to return to normalcy. Fighters who 
remove themselves from the insurgent groups can also possibly provide information about the 
support networks, which is the lifeline of any insurgent group. Second, the Taliban and other 
insurgent groups make use of local fighters. The insurgent groups usually uses a core of 
“hardcore ideologically driven” fighters who serve as their “flying column” or expeditionary 
force sent out to fight coalition forces.
142
 This means that they usually return to their 
sanctuaries, which in most cases, are over the border into Pakistan. The proximity of these 
provinces to the border means that it is imperative to have an efficient system for 
reintegration so that the fighters willing to be reintegrated are able to feel safe even when the 
“flying columns” return.          
 These two aspects are at the core, both of the reintegration policies and for the COIN 
effort. Having Afghan leaders responsible for the effort removes the foreign forces from the 
“leadership” position as such and allows Afghan solutions be provided for Afghan problems. 
This is in line, both with the wishes of the government of Afghanistan and with plans for a 
responsible withdrawal in 2014.
143
 In terms of the COIN effort, it allows for a separation of 
local fighters who are reconcilable versus fighters who are irreconcilable and who need to be 
neutralized.            
 However, there are other cultural aspects that are important to this process that cannot 
be underestimated. “Badal,” as stated earlier, is an important part of Pashtun culture. If ISAF 
forces do not have a basic understanding of the importance of the customs, both specific and 
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important to the culture in which they are operating, they could end up being 
counterproductive. An example may be that the fighters have lost family members as civilian 
casualties. This, as discussed earlier, is one of the most detrimental aspects of combat 
operations within a COIN campaign. In this case, the fighter has to get “badal” so that his 
honor is not impacted because he was not able to avenge their death.    
 The pamphlet COIN: Common Sense, written by ISAF for forces conducting COIN, 
describes a good example of another aspect of dealing with reintegration, which is linked to 
Afghan perception of the reintegration effort.       
 “A mid-level Taliban commander who commands 40 insurgents was thinking about 
reintegrating. He approached a trusted community elder for advice. This community elder had a good 
relationship with ISAF, so he suggested that together they go see the nearby ISAF FOB (Forward 
Operating Base) to get more information on how to enroll in the program. When they got to the FOB, 
ISAF forces identified the Taliban commander as someone on the targeting list, and immediately 
detained the commander, and later transferred him to a detention center”. 144   
 This illustrates the importance for troops on the ground to be a conscious part of the effort. 
The focus on sustainable solutions is the article’s focus and it emphasizes an important aspect 
of the ongoing COIN effort. Though the Taliban commander was on the target list, the troops 
might have proceeded differently due to the village leaders’ standing. This can be a 
particularly important issue in the provinces that share a border with Pakistan. Because they 
are more sparsely populated than other provinces, the importance of well-thought-out 
conducted operations cannot be underestimated. Destroying the relationship, as in the 
example above, with both the fighters under the commander and with the local village elder 
would seem counterproductive and could possibly create more insurgents. Understanding 
culture is the heart of this issue, because the tribal system is at the core of the communities in 
the area of operations; therefore, having troops adhere to a slightly more flexible doctrine 
with utilitarian undercurrents, is important to the effort of reducing fighters’ willingness to 
reintegrate and continue to create sustainable solutions.  It should not, however, be used as a 
“get out-of-jail -free card,” but discretion for the greater good would appear to be the 
appropriate approach.         
 Honor is another important aspect of the culture of the Pashtuns and Nuristanis in 
Afghanistan. It is important to ensure that fighters who wish to reintegrate into their 
communities have their honor intact when they do reintegrate.  Yet, ISAF forces using words 
like “surrender” make negotiations difficult. Also, if the fighters are perceived to have lost 
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face when contacting ISAF forces about reintegration, it could be difficult for the soldiers to 
receive them without difficulty. This difficulty lies with the inherent fact that combat and 
seeking out “irreconcilable” insurgents cause losses for the ISAF forces. This is not to say that 
soldiers lack professionalism in their work, but rather arguing that anger towards fighters who 
have lost a comrade or fellow soldier is no less painful for ISAF personnel than it is for 
Afghans. Therefore, one could argue that the idea of retribution on the part of ISAF forces 
may be a contributing factor when it comes to reintegrating willing insurgents. The need to 
assert certain dominance over a “vanquished” foe may be present and could possibly be an 
overwhelming feeling when ISAF personnel are faced with a former enemy. That would also 
explain the unyielding emphasis that newsletters put on this difficult issue.
145
 In several of the 
COIN: Common Sense magazines, the need for respect towards both reintegrated fighters and 
unfriendly villagers is an aspect that is important for changing attitudes.   
 The main goal of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan is to quell the insurgency that 
threatens the sitting government. To be able to leave the country responsibly, the ISAF forces 
have to be able to hand over responsibility for a significant part of their mission to the Afghan 
government, the Afghan people, and the Afghan security forces. Understanding the culture 
and having sufficient knowledge of the people living in a region, province, or village is 
important when it comes to decisions on a tactical level. Successfully working together across 
very different cultural lines is a difficult aspect of partnering in COIN. What may have 
worked in one region may fail in another, not necessarily because needs are that different but 
because the partnering between ISAF and Afghan forces is not progressing the way it should. 
Misunderstanding aspects of culture in Afghanistan can lead to mistakes that may be difficult 
to recover from. Banking, for example, is virtually non-existent outside of major urban hubs. 
There is a heavy dependence on cash and paying cash for services or goods.
146
 Therefore, if 
Afghan security forces leave without permission, it may be likely that they are returning to 
their village to give money to their families. For a Western soldier, this cannot only be seen as 
very backwards, but it also breaks with the discipline that soldiers are supposed to have. One 
does not leave without the correct permissions from the officer in charge. This, however, 
seems to be more acceptable in Afghanistan because of the lack of banking systems and the 
vast distances that may have to be travelled to reach villages.
147
  
                                               
145 International Security and Assistance Force COIN: Common Sense January 2011 
146 Samuel Chan, Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army in Military Review January 
February 2009: p. 33  
147 Ibid. p. 33 (Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army) 
52 
 
These are problems that face the members of the Afghan security forces and are hard 
to comprehend, and possibly deal with, on the ground level for ISAF forces. Because levels of 
desertion, or leave without permission, make it difficult to maintain unit cohesion for 
mentoring forces that are ultimately in charge of the process of creating a new Afghan army, 
frustration could be an issue for ISAF.
148
        
 The ability to conduct operations with partnering units, regardless of desertion rates 
and administrative difficulties, lies with the individual soldier that is part of the COIN 
campaign. The argument can be made that because cultural understanding on the most basic 
tactical level is important in COIN, it makes the individual soldier or operator much more 
“important” than in conventional warfare. Dominique Savel, a French alpine trooper, wrote in 
an issue of COIN: Common Sense: “Everyone in partnered units must personally invest in the 
effort to ensure success…Technology eases communication connectivity, but it cannot 
replace the basic necessity of communication: human interaction…Afghans are accustomed to 
face-to-face communication.”149 Those three aspects, addressed by Savel, indicate that the 
campaign in areas like Kunar and Nuristan is more dependent on this interaction than one 
might expect in Nangarhar. In Kunar and Nuristan there is little in the way of communication 
except for word of mouth, and with this comes the emphasis on efficient ways of 
communicating, and possibly more importantly, what message is communicated throughout 
the province or village. Having an open dialogue, as the article describes, is key, not only 
when operations are going fairly smooth, but also when something has gone wrong.
150
 The 
U.S. forces’ ability to deal with a situation in a manner that constructively restores confidence 
among the community, while not stepping on any “cultural” toes, is crucial to the strategy of 
partnering with the Afghan security forces in a way to establish their presence in a region as a 
viable alternative to ISAF forces. The care to not step on “cultural” toes has to be taken in a 
way not to disregard advice from the security forces regarding a problem. A combination of 
allowing village elders and the Afghan security forces to take the lead while being mentored 
will allow for less dependence on the international forces.
151
     
 The assessment that can be made from this analysis on aspects of culture and 
reintegration is that some projects are useful within the country where the effort is being 
conducted. In this case the reintegration program. It should efficiently deal with, and be aware 
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of, the aspects that are important to the people the counterinsurgents are trying reintegrate. At 
all levels, it is important that soldiers show the ability to make decisions based on a limited 
degree on their discretion, which was evident with the Taliban commander. It is of significant 
importance to understand that the culture the counterinsurgent comes from may differ in 
many ways to that of the population that the insurgent hides within. Though this may seem 
obvious, it has been shown to be a difficult aspect that needs consideration, both on the 
tactical and strategic level. That is, considerations have to be taken with the audience that the 
effort is aimed at. Expecting that a project will work the same way in two different regions, or 
even villages, may cause problems because it is not adapted to local circumstances. 
 
3.2 Western Forms of Democracy and Afghan Culture 
The country of Afghanistan has been at a state of war for more than three decades. When the 
Obama administration reviewed the U.S. policy towards the mission in Afghanistan, the 
administration decided that in order to have a successful withdrawal of troops and make sure 
that the country would not again become a safe haven for terrorists, stability had to be 
ensured.
152
 Nevertheless, that is far easier said than implemented. It seems that the idea of a 
centralized government in Afghanistan is not as bad an idea as it could first appear, based as it 
is on the regional structures and lack of infrastructure. Instead of accepting the current 
common perception that the country is more or less ungovernable because of regional 
autonomy and lack of a credible government for thirty years, one should, according to 
Thomas Barfield, examine the country’s history more thoroughly.153 Barfield argues against 
the perception that presupposes an inherent opposition towards centralized government in 
Afghan culture. The historical reality is that Afghanistan has more facets than many decision-
makers in Europe and in the United States recognize.
154
 He argues that many decision-makers 
in coalition countries have been colored by the idea that Afghans will oppose any foreign 
involvement in their national affairs: “The most basic reason was that Afghanistan had always 
been more complex than the simple picture painted by the press. Nor was Afghanistan in 2001 
the same place with the same attitudes that it had been two hundred, one hundred, or even 
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twenty-five years ago.”155 This could arguably be at the core of the problem with creating a 
new centralized government in Afghanistan. How the foreign forces follow and adhere to this 
perception of Afghanistan’s history appears to differ from what the situation is today as 
compared to when the mission started. This is not to say that all aspects of the cultural 
understanding of how the Afghan political culture has evolved, and been affected, by events 
over the last decades are wrong. However, the situation in Afghanistan is now different from 
what it was in early 2006 when the insurgency started to gain new momentum. With regard to 
Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar, Barfield’s book makes it clear that there is a definite gap 
between the ISAF perception on democracy and how Afghans perceive democratic 
governance.          
 Afghanistan has not always been the place it is today, where the standard of living is 
one of the lowest in the world. It has had periods of peace and prosperity. Barfield argues that 
the issue with enabling a viable government and sustainable security situation has become 
particularly difficult because the ISAF forces are applying a style of democracy that is not 
necessarily in tune with the traditions and culture of the country itself. The difficulties that are 
experienced with reintegrating insurgents and partnering issues at the local level appear 
slightly different on the national level. Persuading people to trust that Karzai’s government 
actually will work once most of the foreign forces leave is, to some extent, a question of trust 
in democratic forms of government. However, creating a democracy in a country that has two 
generations who know little else than conflict needs to be handled in a different manner than 
creating a centralized government in Kabul that disperses the State’s resources based on a 
medieval structure of personal favors to remain in power.
156
  In provinces like Kunar and 
Nuristan that have historically been more isolated than Nangarhar, which contains the key 
urban hub in the east, the understanding of a functioning government is less. In the isolated 
provinces, there has been little contact with the government in Kabul. The branches of the 
government do not stretch far enough for the provinces like Kunar and Nuristan to see stable 
and continuous positive progress. This is compounded with the population’s poverty, where 
most of Afghanistan’s people exist as subsistence farmers and have resolved local disputes in 
a traditional way for centuries. It would seem, that for many villagers there is little need for a 
centralized government that in their eyes, exists only on paper. However, if politics would 
materialize in practical improvements, their view on politics might change.  
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 One can argue that the people in these regions, regardless of how poorly developed the 
regions may be, do not simply want to live at an existential minimum. If asked, it is likely that 
they would want to see improvements in their living conditions. More importantly, it is likely 
that, regardless of political regimes, they want to see a more peaceful situation, which has 
been observed through successful projects like road construction and building of wells.
157
 
Most people in Afghanistan want to see their country become a better place. This may sound 
very obvious but a quote from Barfield’s book sheds light on the ambiguity of this argument: 
“Regions [in Afghanistan, TKP] wanted a direct choice in how they were to be governed at a 
local level. The international community saw assertions of such regional autonomy as signs of 
disorder that needed to be curbed.”158 In counterinsurgency, when it comes to partnering, the 
emphasis has to be on learning how the other party conducts themselves, and then apply how 
one conducts oneself into the equation and acting, so to speak, on the result of the merger of 
these two aspects. Therefore, understanding the local culture is more than simply knowing 
how to behave in “social” settings on the battlefield. Integrating the understanding into actual 
policy and achieving results on strategic goals seems harder on the strategic/national level 
than achieving it in tactical situations at the local level.     
 The divide between urban and rural areas in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to 
cultural understanding in COIN operations, could arguably be considered two worlds. As a 
thought experiment, one can imagine a person who has been living in a remote location with 
little formal education, compared to a person in Kabul who may have had twelve years 
education, possibly even in universities outside of the country. The values that these people 
adhere to are probably vastly different from each other. What a person in Kabul sees as a 
political necessity based on his/her understanding of international relations today is most 
likely completely different from what the farmer in a remote village sees as important. The 
farmer’s immediate concerns are likely not to be connected to international relations, but 
rather relations within the areas that surround the village. For the farmer his main interest may 
be his immediate security. For the person in Kabul or Jalalabad, his/her interests may go 
further and contain more facets than that of the farmer, who lives more isolated. The problem 
with conducting COIN operations in areas of eastern Afghanistan is that both these kinds of 
problems have to be addressed simultaneously and with more or less the same approach.  To 
add to the complexity, the counterinsurgents must take into account their own culture and 
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their values that come into play when dealing with Afghans and COIN operations.  
 The problem with using the urban/rural divide is that it can tend to be an 
oversimplification, used to explain a complex situation in a complex country. This is not to 
say that it has no bearing at all. Rather, the divide is an issue that needs to be taken into 
account, but it should be used as a guide instead of an idea that reigns true in all parts of 
Afghanistan.
159
 In Kunar and Nuristan, which are less developed than Nangarhar, it is likely 
to find a more conservative approach to community politics. Nangarhar may also be more 
“modern” in terms of policies and the implementation of aid programs than what one would 
expect in mountain villages in Kunar and Nuristan. This would not be an oversimplification. 
Though one can argue that the urban/rural divide is an oversimplification of the situation in 
Afghanistan, it still is an issue that needs consideration when conducting COIN operations. 
The three provinces discussed in this chapter showcase that the argument for the rural/urban 
divide holds some validity because the differences between the provinces are more 
pronounced. This is especially true because both Kunar and Nuristan are remote and poorly 
developed compared to Nangarhar. The two remote locations are also a factor as Nangarhar is 
closer to Kabul and the central government.        
 
3.3 The Importance of Religion and Tribal Dynamics in Afghanistan 
 The concept, “center of gravity,” is described in the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency field 
manual as: “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, 
or will to act.”160 In other words, center of gravity is meant to designate what gives the 
insurgency its driving forces. It could also mean what the civilian population’s main driving 
force may be, i.e. what the most important aspect of their daily lives are. Even though Obama 
did not use the specific words “center of gravity” in his speeches, it is nonetheless a fact that 
the American COIN effort is focused on the establishment of a functioning government as the 
main priority, in addition to providing security for the population. In the Commander’s Initial 
Assessment (2009) and in several of President Obama’s speeches regarding the Afghan 
civilian populations, the “center of gravity,” though not specifically spelled out, appears as a 
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combination of a functioning government and security.
161
     
 Eva Shinagel has asked whether the American COIN effort may have missed the mark 
with regard to the population’s center of gravity.162 Shinagel presents the idea that though the 
issues that the COIN efforts have focused on are important, the religious aspect of the “human 
terrain” in Afghanistan has been bypassed because of lack of understanding.163 She holds that 
the counterinsurgents do not adequately understand the importance that religion plays in 
Afghanistan. The reason, as she describes it, is the fact that the Afghans, particularly the rural 
populations, are skeptical because they interpret the American effort as having religious 
undertones.
164
 When this statement is seen in conjunction with the numbers on literacy and 
education, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, the possibility for the emergence of problems 
is understandable. The Jihadist websites have a tendency to focus on the belief that the fight 
in Afghanistan is not only a fight for the people of Afghanistan, but it is a fight for Islam 
itself. It is described as a “Jihad” against the “heathen occupiers” in Afghanistan. This calls 
for fighters to stand and fight for Islam in an effort to oust the Americans from Afghanistan, 
not because they are seen as foreign invaders, but because they are “enemies” of Islam.165 If 
this is indeed the case it creates a significantly more difficult “terrain” for the 
counterinsurgents, especially because the effort in eastern Afghanistan has predominantly 
been used to reinforce the central Government.      
 This effort has been used to convince the civilian population of the government’s 
legitimacy, rather than being focused on removing misconceptions about the “actual” 
intentions of the United States and its army. This creates an environment where the 
fundamental understanding of the “human terrain” is in question because the effort is, to a 
degree, based on the notion that there is a basic understanding of why the foreign forces are in 
Afghanistan. However, this appears to differ because a great number of Afghans see the 
intervention as a fight for moral values, rather than for material benefit.
166
   
 Aspects of the Pashtun culture have been examined above, but it is important to 
analyze an aspect of this culture that seems to become more important in the context of 
religion. As seen earlier, tribal ties span the Afghan and Pakistani border. There are strong 
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community ties across the border, and it would seem likely that these connections also come 
into the domain of religion.
167
 If that is the case, then the COIN efforts in Afghanistan would 
also face with safe havens in Pakistan, a multifaceted environment where tribal ties, whether 
ad-hoc or enduring, come into play with religious ideas that the insurgents use to their benefit 
for propaganda purposes. Based on what Eva Shinagel writes on the “moral center of 
gravity,” it is likely that the COIN effort faces obstacles of a complex and intertwined nature: 
In Afghanistan the counterinsurgent has to convince the population that the government they 
are supporting is strong and most likely will continue to exist after a drawdown. On the other 
hand, they have to show the people who live outside of the area of operations, that the U.S. is 
not waging war on Islam. That is far harder to do, for example, with Pashtuns living across 
the border in Pakistan because what they perceive is likely to be the negative effects of the 
COIN operations. They do not benefit from rebuilding projects in the same way as people 
inside the area of operations, but they are exposed to insurgent propaganda nonetheless, 
specifically because the safe havens insurgent “flying columns” use, are the border areas. 
Finally, an especially important aspect of the culture environment in the border areas of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, is this: What the counterinsurgents perceived to be the reason for 
the insurgency may turn out to be a completely different issue than what was expected at the 
start of the COIN campaign. “Coalition Force efforts to shore up legitimacy of the 
government, through supply of essential services and local security, have neglected to fully 
understand the basis of the critical public perceptions that remain.”168 This illustrates that, 
though a campaign may be going well and one sees measurable progress, other core issues 
such as religious belief across borders may be affecting the situation in a way that is far less 
easy to detect.                  
 
To sum up, the most important “local” aspect of COIN, both for the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents, is the population of the area that is contested. For the insurgents it 
represents a population that they need to be able to hide among and subvert government and 
security force’s activities. The counterinsurgents need the population to be cooperative 
because of the insurgents’ dependence on the population base as its hiding place and base of 
support. Kilcullen in Counterinsurgency (2010) describes the networks that support the 
insurgents as the ones that the counterinsurgents needs to “persuade” to follow the 
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government. This means making the civilian population that supports the insurgents “see” that 
the government is a better alternative than the insurgents.
169
 In Afghanistan, the 
counterinsurgents’ ability to produce visible and viable results, whether those are well-
building programs or large governmental programs, is at the core of making the population 
that supports the insurgents “see” why the government should be supported. To be able to 
achieve this mission the counterinsurgents, which in the case of Afghanistan is an outsider, 
must be aware of the “human terrain” that they are working within. This means that a 
significant pressure is put not only on high command to understand the cultural workings of 
the country they are operating in. It also requires platoon leaders and individual soldiers to be 
significantly more aware of the culture of people they are trying to protect, including the basic 
cultural aspects of politics and religion.
170
 Being able to do this will, in a best-case scenario, 
enable the counterinsurgents to have reasonable dialogue with the power brokers of the area, 
as well as gain local support on their side who that have the most intimate knowledge of the 
area because they are locals and can navigate with more ease the difficult cultural 
environment. The need for local support, not only for the “cause” in general, but for 
individual areas, is necessary because one solution that works in one village may not work in 
another village the same way. Therefore, being able to apply local solutions to villages and 
areas based on an understanding of that particular province or region is one of the keys to 
success.          
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Chapter 4 
4 U.S.-Pakistani Relations and the Effect on Operations in Afghanistan 
Pakistan and the United States have had what could only be described as a rocky relationship. 
It has gone from mutual support and working together during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan to the brinkmanship that now seems prevalent in their relationship. This chapter 
seeks to explore how this relationship affects the COIN operations and efforts of obtaining 
stability in Afghanistan. The Obama administration addressed this issue early, stating that 
there was no possible way to deal with Afghanistan without dealing “responsibly” with 
Pakistan.
171
 The facets of this relationship, which are of particular importance regarding its 
effect on the operations in Afghanistan, specifically in the three provinces discussed earlier, 
could arguably be boiled down to three main issues which are elaborated in this chapter. 
 First, according to scholars, American foreign policy has always been concerned about 
Pakistan, but never actually implemented a defined strategy for dealing with Pakistan 
responsibly like President Obama set out to do at the start of his presidency.
172
 The 
elaboration of this issue covers how the strategy, or lack thereof, affects Pakistan today, 
specifically focusing on how the country’s lack of ability to master its own domestic issues 
flows over into its foreign policy in a way that has continually caused trouble for the U.S.                                                                                                                                                                       
-Pakistani relationship.          
 Second, Pakistan has played host to a significant number of militant networks and 
extremist movements. The tribal agencies that border Afghanistan now serve as sanctuaries 
for the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin (HiG) and factions or chapters of Al-Qaeda.
173
 This does not include the myriad of 
militant tribal factions that also inhabit these areas. The issue with this is Pakistan’s use of 
proxy forces for its foreign policy strategies not only against the government in Afghanistan 
and the American troops in the country but in general with special regard to its strategy 
towards India.
174
 Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been connected to the use of proxy 
forces and that is one of the key aspects of how the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is affecting the 
operations in Afghanistan.          
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 Third, are the U.S. drone strikes in the tribal agencies of Pakistan and their profound 
effect on U.S.-Pakistani relations. As will be shown, the effect has been for the most part 
negative for Pakistan. The word “negative” refers both to the Pakistani army’s way of 
communicating with the Pakistani public, stirring anti-American feelings in many cases, and 
to the U.S. secrecy around the operations, which has been received badly by most of 
Pakistan’s governing elite and the general population. 
 
4.1 Pakistan’s Domestic and Foreign Policy  
President Obama set out early in his presidency to handle relations with Pakistan better than 
the previous administration had done.
175
 He promised a more comprehensive and complete 
strategy, which would include Pakistan as an important ally in the region and for the coming 
transition of responsibility in Afghanistan to Afghani forces.
176
 Part of this approach was a 
three billion dollar support package given to Pakistan to help build infrastructure and military 
capacity.
177
 The agreement on a substantial aid package from 2009 and onwards seems to 
have helped very little. The problem with American foreign policy in this regard is that the 
stated objective is to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s safe havens and terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas. This objective has been driven home in most speeches Obama has held, when 
discussing progress in Afghanistan. To reach this objective would require involvement to a 
significant degree with Pakistan rather than Afghanistan. A large number of highly trained 
fighters and insurgents are using the tribal areas as a staging ground, and their numbers do not 
seem to be diminishing. The likely low level of Al-Qaeda operatives compared to the 
significant amount of insurgents who are connected with other militant groups like the HQN, 
Afghan Taliban, and HiG indicates that these groups present a bigger threat to stability than 
Al-Qaeda. This is not to say that there are not Al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan, but rather 
they have moved into the tribal agencies of Pakistan from where they launch and plan attacks. 
This is the background for the increasing number of drone strikes the U.S. has initiated and is 
part of the somewhat troublesome relationship with U.S.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
policy on the matter of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Al-Qaeda.    
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 These matters are presented in speeches and in the media as much the same; however, 
policy reviews and official papers show the differentiations more clearly, and as the March 
review on progress for both countries from 2011 showed, there is still a long way to go.
178
 
The objective and the strategy seem to be based on two seemingly different ideas. The stated 
objective is to eliminate the terrorist threat that Al-Qaeda poses to U.S. interests and security. 
The problem with the objective is that there are large and difficult sub-objectives that make 
up the one primary objective. These sub-objectives are tantamount to nation building, not 
only in Afghanistan but also to a certain degree in Pakistan, which means juggling two sets of 
very difficult domestic issues that intertwine with Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. The 
effect that this has on regional power structures is important, especially considering 
Pakistan’s focus on India as the biggest threat to its security.    
 Afghanistan wants to maintain its own sovereignty and independence, as much as 
possible and not become a puppet state for any of the regional powers that surround it, or too 
much Western influence. This is an issue that is difficult for the Afghan government to 
resolve, as it is completely dependent on support for its growing security forces, as well as aid 
needed to build infrastructure and create a viable economy. Karzai’s government wants 
Afghanistan to become a kind of nation it does not appear at all ready to become. Elections 
accused of being flawed by fraud and widespread corruption have, as we have seen, created 
serious mistrust in much of the population’s perception of this government.179 An added 
difficulty is the large sums of money that is sent to both of these countries in aid, much of 
which seems to disappear in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s institutionalized corruption. 
Corruption combined with violence, especially in rural areas but also significantly in cities in 
Pakistan such as Karachi, a major trading port, hampers the chance of seeing progress 
“quickly.”180 The triangle that is created by the division regarding policy, political and 
security related issues that the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan relationships create are 
affecting operations in Afghanistan because the ideal objective seems far from the actual 
realities.            
 The Pakistani government has, since its inception in 1947, been wrought and strained 
between its military and the civil government. It has shown little progress towards becoming 
more stable, and US’ political will to support is lessening after each engagement that fails. 
                                               
178 United States, White House, Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan March 2011: p. 3, 6 
179 United States, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to United States 
Congress April 30 2012: p. 9-10  
180 Ahmed Rashid Pakistan on the Brink 2012: p. 168-169 
64 
 
The operation that killed Osama Bin Laden is possibly the most compelling evidence of the 
dwindling political confidence to support Pakistan. Any further aid the U.S. sends appears 
only possible by setting severe restrictions on how the aid is spent and possibly more 
importantly the “end user” of this aid.181 This is a key part of the problem that faces Pakistan 
in its dealings with the U.S. as it has little to show for the money that has been spent, be it 
military operations that hamper militancy in areas where the Pakistani government has little 
control or the country’s inability to institute reform to prevent the country from destabilizing. 
 Pakistan has for a long time had a struggling economy and these financial problems 
are not likely to be resolved within a short time. There is a high percentage of unemployment, 
especially among youths, which is a serious problem. One of the biggest issues related to 
poverty and unemployment is the resulting susceptibility towards extremism. A large number 
of disgruntled youths could possibly be one of Pakistan’s more pressing domestic problems. 
Youths in Pakistan face a less than smooth transfer from schooling to employment, which 
impacts the amount of time they spend unemployed. Many end up doing low paying jobs like 
unpaid work in family businesses and “casual wage” labor.182 This type of work does not 
offer much in terms of social advancement, though in many rural parts in Pakistan, that may 
be the accepted norm. Youths could be at risk if the society does not provide a counterweight 
to the Taliban’s and other groups “mercenary” money. This type of job may just consist of 
firing a rocket at a convoy to harass either coalition forces or Pakistani security personnel and 
has the appearance of being quick cash. Villagers in Afghanistan have been paid $15-55 for 
these types of operations.
183
          
 When faith in a type of stable government disappears, there are several avenues that 
could end in extremism. One aspect could simply be the drive to earn money, as stated above, 
even if that means becoming a fighter for a cause that they themselves may not believe in 
fully. Reintegration efforts in Afghanistan have shown that there are a significant number of 
fighters who simply fight because there are few other options – to either coercion by 
insurgents forcing them to fight or choosing to fight because the money earned by fighting is 
much higher than if they earned a living in subsistence agriculture. Agriculture is the main 
income for many both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
184
  David Kilcullen demonstrated this 
with his case study of Kunar province, which showed that there are few hardcore extremist 
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full-time fighters compared to those whom he describes as “accidental guerillas.”185 That is, 
people who are called upon when needed, and who do not make up a consistent threat of a 
large singular force like the more experienced fulltime fighters. The worse the economy and 
level of control Pakistan can assert in fragile areas, the more people seem to follow ideas of 
radical Islamic beliefs. It is likely that their ability to counter radicalization and insurgency 
becomes worse in combination with lessening support from the U.S.    
Extremist ideologies within military and civil government in Pakistan along with religious 
leaders that focus on jihad could be a very dangerous cocktail for both domestic security and 
foreign security in Pakistan. Anti-American sentiment coupled with poor and uneducated 
youth that are lead by religious extremists’ thinking poses a significant threat to operations in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s place as a veritable market for insurgent fighters has made the 
country a supplier of suicide bombers and bomb-makers that are employed in Afghanistan.
186
 
Pakistan’s leadership, whether it is military or civilian faces severe domestic threats such as 
the Pakistani Taliban, which is set on overthrowing the state and creating a country that 
strictly adheres to medieval conceptions of Islam, is becoming more brash in its attacks in 
Pakistan.
187
 This gives Pakistan three main domestic insurgency issues which all require an 
approach that the government is not able or willing to conduct: One, the insurgency in 
Baluchistan is becoming more and more violent and shows no signs of being reduced 
regardless of efforts by the Pakistani Army and the intelligence services to quell it.
188
 Human 
rights abuse has been widely reported and, which in terms of COIN from a Pakistani 
perspective is making the situation worse. Two, the Pakistani Taliban conducts terrorist 
actions against Pakistani targets with increased intensity and makes it difficult for the 
Pakistani government to deal with them with the urgency that it seems this issue needs. The 
last thing the government needs is to lose key trading cities like Karachi to the group.
189
 
 Third, the sanctuaries that the tribal areas provide the insurgents are valuable as safe 
havens and training grounds for a wide range of extremist groups. These groups seem to use 
the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as veritable proving grounds for their people and 
for preparations of other coming operations. There seems to be a dangerous mix of young new 
militant fighters and older experienced fighters who may even have fought against the 
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Soviets. This hypothesis is presented by Rohan Gunaratna and Kuram Iqbal in Pakistan: 
Terrorism Ground Zero (2012). Fighters from the Soviet era come in contact with new 
recruits and the insurgents are increasingly being able to learn from older fighters’ experience. 
These fighters do not necessarily see any difference between the Soviet invasion and U.S. 
involvement after 9/11. These teachings are imprinted on the new cadre of fighters, which are 
likely the new fighters with the idea that the “new” Jihad is against the American aggressors 
in Afghanistan.
190
 If this is more prevalent than expected, especially in the tribal agencies and 
across the border into Afghanistan then the U.S. forces there may be facing a problem that is 
not so easy to fix. If fighters traveling across the border believe that they are fighting a Jihad, 
this time against Americans, it may have an effect on the younger elements. This means that 
for children and youths who grow up in these regions where there is little except subsistence 
agriculture, the offer to go to Jihad against Americans in Afghanistan could prove to be an 
enticing prospect. It could be both because of training in radical madrassas and a need for 
something other than farming with the family that attracts younger fighters. Also their parents 
or other family members may have fought before them and there could be an expectation of 
going to fight the heathens in Afghanistan like their elders did.     
 Pakistan’s lack of ability to deal with these domestic problems comes to light also in 
its foreign policy, specifically when it comes to dealing with the U.S. and India. Both these 
countries are tied to what the military establishment wants to portray as their main “enemies.” 
A significant number of scholars argue that the Pakistani government is far too concerned 
with external enemies than its own domestic ones. Whether or not this is completely accurate, 
Pakistan has experienced some incidents that have made the current regime seem a great deal 
less trustworthy in the eyes of the U.S. and other international actors. The operation to capture 
Bin Laden may have been the most significant of these incidents, at least for the U.S. For 
Pakistani military officials, it was not important outwardly that the most wanted terrorist in 
the world had been living almost next to their prestigious military academy. The main reason 
for uproar was U.S. infringement of Pakistani sovereignty.
191
 For Pakistan domestically, the 
attack on the Mehran Naval Station made its military seem more incompetent as a small 
number of suicide fighters caused massive amounts of collateral damage.
192
 The most 
significant fallout from the Naval Station was the suspicion that a service member had aided 
the suicide attackers, damaging the military’s standing with the public because of its inability 
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to root out “bad seeds” effectively.193 The lack of control and apparent incompetence impacts 
Pakistan’s standing in the international community. Pakistan is being watched meticulously 
because of the country’s long-standing use of terrorism and proxy forces like the Haqqani 
network and certain cadres of the Afghan Taliban to influence its standing in Afghanistan and 
use them as instruments to further their own foreign policy.    
 Stephen D. Krasner argues that U.S. patience with Pakistan should have ended a long 
time ago. He refers to Admiral Mullen’s testimony where the admiral said that the Pakistani 
state and its government, specifically the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), “use proxy 
forces as their strategic arm.”194 Mullen further said that the Haqqani network had been 
responsible for many of the major engagements of 2011, including the hotel attack in Kabul 
and a truck bomb that killed 77 soldiers.
195
 Because of these attacks, the Pakistani 
government’s problems and disregard for U.S. requests to firmly deal with the militant threat, 
as well as reducing their contact with proxy forces, Krasner argues that the U.S. government 
should now treat the country as a hostile country, much the same as Iran or North Korea. The 
Pakistani nuclear program and its proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries that the U.S. 
sees as hostile underlines the need for stopping the aid that has been given to support the 
military and civilian projects.
196
 Krasner recommends this because as he sees it, the lack of 
cooperation from the other party shows that the U.S. has no “stick” left to use against Pakistan 
other than a drastic one. If anything, to completely neglect the relationship with the intent to 
spur the country into action.
197
 While conducting this neglect, emphasis is also put on a far 
more unilateral response to militancy in the tribal agencies. He therefore advocates increased 
use of drone attacks and incursions by Special Forces units to neutralize targets within 
Pakistan. His reference to Admiral Mullen indicates that he is not alone in his 
recommendation to completely ignore the Pakistanis, and there are likely more people in the 
current administration that sees the issue with Pakistan as something that should be addressed 
more harshly. Even Obama said that the “days of a blank check” are over.198   
 The problem with expressing these types of sentiments is that it feeds into the “fear-
machine” that the military establishment wishes the Pakistani public to listen to. Again, the 
handling of the Bin Laden operations and drone strikes attests to this. Krasner also sees it as 
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imperative for the U.S. to have a better working relationship with India.
199
 This would most 
likely feed into Pakistani fears of a strong India in Afghanistan with the blessing of the U.S. It 
would appear the current situation is that the Pakistani government has failed to uphold its 
promises and live up to its part of the deal with U.S. If the U.S. begins to neglect the 
relationship with Pakistan, it would likely be detrimental to the effort in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s proxy forces would be given the green light to increase operations in Afghanistan 
because strategically it would make sense for Pakistan to undermine U.S. progress. This may 
make sense to the military and ISI, but with the political and civil unrest in the country, it 
would seem that Pakistan might not be able to carry through a unilateral approach if a shift in 
U.S. policy were to come. What does appear to be a more likely result is a further worsening 
of security for operations within Afghanistan, especially in the eastern border areas. As we 
have seen with COIN operations in Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan, heightened activity leads 
to a worsening of the security environment that again leads to a more unstable Afghanistan 
and in turn more violence in the tribal agencies as well.   
 
4.2 Proxy Forces and Militancy in the Tribal Agencies 
Pakistan has been a frequent user of proxy forces as a “strategic” part of its foreign policy, 
especially in relation to India. These forces are used both against India in the conflict in 
Kashmir and to exert influence on politics in Afghanistan in order to gain strategic depth in 
the region to further put pressure on India. Pakistan has a long-standing history of using these 
forces as a covert arm of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its military establishment.
200
 
The attacks on the parliament in Mumbai in 2008 were an example where the Pakistani 
intelligence services were implicated.
201
 There have been a long series of near clashes, both 
with India and the U.S. because of the long-standing ties between the military and militants 
who have sought refuge in the FATA areas. These areas, from the Russian invasion and until 
present day, have become refuges because of the support that the Pakistani intelligence 
services sent through these areas.
202
 The history of this area and the use of the Mujahedin in 
the 1980’s against the Soviet invasion created the base for the current security issues that 
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threaten COIN operations in Afghanistan today. Both the Haqqani Network (HQN) and HiG 
were spawned out of the “first” Jihad against foreign invaders in Afghanistan. The sons of 
those fighters are now part of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
203
   
 The use of proxy forces, which now has become a significant security issue for 
Pakistan and the United States in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, stems from 
the handling of these fighters from the time that they fought against the Russians. After the 
war, Pakistan was not able to reintegrate the fighters coming back into the tribal agencies 
from Afghanistan. These fighters later became the heads of the HQN network and HiG, 
networks that could be considered the biggest threat to operations in Afghanistan from the 
Pakistani side of the border. The two networks are both active in Nangarhar, Kunar, and 
Nuristan. HiG has a more definite presence in Kunar and Nuristan. HQN has presence in 
Nangarhar and Kunar, using the latter as an infiltration route from which to launch attacks in 
the capital.
204
 The security issues that these two groups represent thus may be considered a 
product of both American and Pakistani failure to responsibly deal with militants when they 
have used them as strategic partners earlier.       
 Pakistan has nevertheless maintained close ties to both groups because it seeks to have 
the ability to affect politics in Afghanistan. Specifically, Pakistan has wanted to have the 
ability to stop Indian influence on the government there. Pakistan has, in many cases, used 
covert ways of attacking Indian installations in Afghanistan through the use of these forces. 
Most prevalently the HQN has been used, as they seem to have a significant ability to conduct 
operations more similar to highly organized military operations. This means that HQN is able 
to conduct specialized operations that require significant planning, several phases of attack 
and has the ability to attack targets that insurgents would rather stay away from because of the 
likelihood of casualties on their part.
205
        
 The lack of control in the FATA areas can be contributed to the historic 
mismanagement of the Pakistani state towards these areas. Thus, there are both socio-
economic factors and security policy factors that play into the Pakistani government’s lack of 
ability to now control their proxy forces. The ISI has had a long-standing relationship with 
these forces and were the ones to who helped them get organized as far back as the Soviet 
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invasion and also during the Taliban regime in Kabul before 9/11.
206
 As the ISI and the 
military has left HQN and HiG alone because these two networks have stayed away from 
Pakistani military targets these groups have become autonomous. The autonomy arose from 
the support-fleeing fighters got from these two networks as they changed base of operations 
from mainland Afghanistan to the Pakistani border areas. They were now much more capable 
of fending for themselves with improved weaponry, better communications, and extremely 
well developed terrain knowledge. These two groups have become the main two insurgent 
threats, excluding the Afghan Taliban lead by Mullah Omar.    
 HiG’s leader, Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, has said that he is willing to entertain the idea of 
some kind of accord with the U.S. and the current Kabul regime. However, an article from 
late 2010 suggests that even if he might be willing to talk, what the Afghan people would 
think of a “peace” deal with this violent insurgent may not go down well.207 This might be 
one of the more difficult aspects for Kabul, Islamabad and Washington to handle. However 
much the governments may want to reconcile the autonomous insurgent groups, they may 
experience difficulty because the population may resent the notion that these people whom 
the government previously has labeled as criminals now get a free pass because the U.S. 
wants to withdraw. Hence, the Government of Afghanistan is not able to quell the insurgency 
on its own and Pakistani leaders continue to view their live and let live policy with the 
networks as beneficial even though they could end up having less control over them. 
 The Haqqani Network has no intention of giving up its “Jihad” and the freedom fight 
for fellow Muslims in Afghanistan against infidel foreign invading forces. They are 
considered by the U.S. to be irreconcilable in most part. This means that they cannot be 
persuaded to lay down their arms and surrender. They are one of the few insurgent groups that 
also have been listed as terrorists and that is usually tantamount to being a group to be 
neutralized rather than conciliated, even though some talks have been initiated.
208
 These talks 
seem to strengthen the aggressive stance of the HQN, as well as increasing its attacks in 
Afghanistan. The willingness of the Network to enter into talks seems slim at the present 
moment also because of the increasingly large operations that they have conducted in 
Afghanistan. Jeffery Dressler has written two reports on the Haqqani Network for the Institute 
for the Study of War. Dressler’s findings seem to underline the analysis above. Haqqani is 
growing in both strength and operational ability alongside becoming stronger in its 
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sanctuaries in Waziristan to the point where they operate like a violent shadow government,
209
 
levying taxes and controlling both legal and illegal businesses.      
 One argument against the focus on the HQN as a viable part of the government 
structure in Afghanistan comes from the stance that this group has no real public support. This 
is linked to their indiscriminate use of suicide bombers and suicide attackers that often cause 
civilian casualties. Their more spectacular attacks in the last few years, though aimed at 
Afghan security forces and ISAF forces, have caused a significant number of civilian 
casualties and therefore created more fear than support.
210
 Though this is a relevant argument 
with regard to establishing a workable security environment in Afghanistan and securing 
partners with that objective in mind, the Haqqani network is different from the Taliban. The 
Taliban has publicly said that they may be interested in an agreement that does not exclude 
the current regime in Kabul or a type of democratic government where they may be a part. 
The agenda they forward seems more intent on removing a great deal of American influence 
in Afghanistan, specifically the removal of foreign troops. The key part of that stance is the 
willingness to possibly be part of a peaceful solution through dialogue.    
 The Haqqani network, on its part, is waging a “Jihad” and controls significant criminal 
enterprises in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The resolution for them seems in 
tune with Al-Qaeda’s objectives rather than with the Taliban’s. This is clear also from the 
network’s blatant disregard of Mullah Omar’s edict that as much as possible civilians should 
not be targeted in operations.
211
 The disregard of Omar’s orders indicates also that the 
structure of the Afghan Taliban is fragmented and that that organization has to deal with 
elements that do not adhere to the centralized hierarchy.      
 The lack of control that can be experienced by all networks and organizations that 
participates in this conflict illustrates and underlines all the difficult facets that have to be 
taken into account in the dialogue between the Pakistani government and the U.S. 
government. For example, with regard to the Haqqani Network, the Pakistani military 
intelligence as a whole may not support the network, but they may have elements that do. 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said in late 2011 that:      
 “Coalition and Afghan forces have increased pressure on the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, 
and other insurgents, including a new operation in eastern Afghanistan launched in recent days. But 
our commanders on the ground are increasingly concerned, as they have been for some time, that we 
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have to go after the safe havens across the border in Pakistan. Now, I will be quick to add that the 
Pakistanis also have reason to be concerned about attacks coming at them from across the border in 
Afghanistan”.212          
 This indicates that the U.S. government seems less convinced that the Pakistani ISI 
has been overtly and willingly supportive of all of the Haqqani Networks operations. Rather 
the ISI and the military establishment seem to have possibly realized that they have to 
severely restrict its foreign policy engagements that involve using these types of proxy forces. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, may disagree and see the United States as demanding too much 
because it has lost a high number of personnel while supporting U.S. objectives. In her 
remarks, Clinton does in fact mention this aspect from the Pakistani point of view.
213
 This 
shows that, despite the distinctly troublesome aspects of their relationship, the bi-national 
dialogue is still there, even though Pakistan has made attempts to break off from dialogue. 
The dependence between the two countries, in terms of this conflict, is still there and is not 
likely to disappear for some time.   
 
4.3 U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan and Reactions to Them 
The American War on Terror has come to include several aspects that are controversial to 
partners of the U.S. in this war. The most controversial in the eyes of Pakistan may be the 
drone operations in their tribal agencies. These operations have targeted Al-Qaeda operatives, 
high-ranking leaders of the Taliban and other high value targets linked to other insurgent and 
terror organizations. There has been less controversy in the international community over 
these strikes than there has been inside of Pakistan. The interplay between action, words and 
reactions with regard to this issue will be analyzed in this section.    
 The drone strikes in Pakistan seem to have been seen by the Pakistani government as a 
necessary evil. As noted, the raid that neutralized Bin Laden angered the government and the 
military because they saw it as an infringement on Pakistani sovereignty. This is true; there 
were no warnings before the raid was conducted. In contrast to the Bin Laden operation, 
however, the drone strikes have been launched from bases inside Pakistan with the 
government’s knowledge, at least most of the time. Though the Pakistani government has 
publicly voiced concerns regarding the drone strikes, this seems to have more to do with 
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domestic policy than foreign policy. In general, anti-Americanism is closely linked for groups 
who want to gain or keep political power in Pakistan.
214
 It would seem that the military needs 
the sentiment that is clearly anti-American to maintain its powerful position in Pakistani 
society. The stopping of supplies running from Pakistan and Afghanistan, along with 
requiring CIA officials and other contractors to leave the country (measures which have now 
been rescinded) as a somewhat of a limited response, considering their presentation of the 
strikes and other grievances with the U.S. in for the Pakistani public.
215
 It would seem that, 
though the Pakistani government finds the presence of U.S. forces highly embarrassing and 
would like to see them go, the country is so dependent on the support it receives from 
America that it would not make sense to escalate difficulties in the relationship to the point 
where aid would be completely halted.        
 The drone strikes have caused an  uproar in the ISI and the Pakistani government, but 
they have not been attracting the type of international condemnation that one might expect for 
what the Pakistanis call a clear breach of sovereignty and an offense to the Pakistani 
people.
216
 Going beyond the immediate responses from the Pakistani government, the main 
disapproval of drone strikes is not limited to Pakistan and its supporters. The Pew Research 
Institute recently conducted a study showing that drone strikes are rated unfavorably among 
several allied nations and that there are signs of dwindling support for it among close allies to 
the United States.
217
 But even with this lack of approval from the international community the 
drone strikes are still part of the U.S. main counterterrorism strategy in the tribal areas. These 
attacks have been focused mainly in North and South Waziristan, which is where the Haqqani 
Network has its sanctuaries along with other militant groups among them, Al-Qaeda.
218
 
Though this could be attributed to America’s counterterrorism strategies, the attacks on these 
groups in this fashion could cement and to a certain extent “prove” to fence-sitters that the 
fight or “Jihad” against the Americans is completely justified because of the drone strikes. 
Civilian casualties are most likely one of the major factors that Networks are able to recruit at 
the level they do. The situations in FATA provide militants with an ample supply of youths 
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that are “unemployed and ripe for conversion to the mission of the militants”.219 
Compounding this, the loss of family members or relatives because of unintended collateral 
damages as a result of drone strikes is likely to create more militants rather than reducing the 
numbers. As we have seen this is the case in Afghanistan where COIN efforts have caused 
civilian casualties. Though one cannot make a causal link to increasing drone attacks in North 
and South Waziristan, there seems to be a connection in terms of the number of large attacks 
conducted by insurgents who have their bases in the tribal agencies.   
 
To sum up, in this chapter we have seen that there are a number of interrelated aspects of the 
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan that affect the COIN operations in Afghanistan, 
directly and indirectly and at different levels. At an overall level, it seems clear that not only 
the military, but also the economic support from U.S. to Pakistan is of indirect importance. 
There are strong indications that Pakistan’s economic problems create the soil for recruiting 
youth to extremist groups; not necessarily for ideological or religious reasons, but just as 
much for economic reasons. Recruitments to these groups will also have consequences for the 
operations in Afghanistan, in particular in the eastern provinces that border Pakistan, and 
where the insurgents operate on both sides. Pakistan’s use of proxy groups, which also 
operate on both sides of the border, affects the COIN operations both directly and indirectly, 
because the U.S. considers the use of proxy groups as a sign of the Pakistani government’s 
lack of ability or even will to exert political control/authority in its own territory. This makes 
the U.S. more inclined to reduce its military and economic support to Pakistan. In short, the 
instability in the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan seems to contribute to maintaining 
the political instability within Pakistan, which in turn makes the U.S. even more reluctant to 
give them military and economic support. This somewhat vicious circle may very well 
increase the strength of the insurgent groups that have safe havens in Pakistan and thus 
worsen the conditions for COIN operations in eastern Afghanistan.   
 The effect of drone strikes in Pakistan in terms of the COIN operations in Afghanistan, 
specifically in the eastern provinces, is affected by close ties between residents in Eastern 
Afghanistan and across the border into Pakistan. This means that just by conducting drone 
strikes on the other side of the border, one can end up with two distinctly negative effects. 
Firstly, a more destabilized border area that will very likely see an increase in militant activity 
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due to the instability. Secondly, a worsened security situation in provinces that are important 
to Afghanistan’s ability to maintain its own security past 2014. For these reasons, the drone 
attacks may be counterproductive to the end state objective, which is to leave Afghanistan and 
to make sure it does not become another safe haven for Al-Qaeda. 
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Chapter 5 
5 The Endgame 
The war in Afghanistan has gone on for ten years. It is nearing its likely drawdown in 2014; 
the time when both the U.S. and allies have stated they will draw down their contribution as 
well. Therefore, this time period after President Obama’s strategic change has been and is 
going to be crucial. This thesis focuses on three eastern provinces, for two main reasons: First, 
the eastern provinces discussed have received “attention” in terms of COIN for a shorter 
period of time than for example the southern and northern parts of the country. This means 
that the operations have not been focused there for an extended period of time, giving the 
insurgency more “space” to grow. This time has allowed the insurgents to strengthen their ties 
across the border, as well as to “dig into” the local population. This in turn may make it easier 
to measure progress and setbacks there. Second, these provinces share a border with Pakistan, 
and the hypothesis regarding that was that these provinces are likely to give a better indication 
of impact stemming from any positive or negative changes in the U.S.–Pakistani relationship. 
There are several aspects that have been examined with regard to both the COIN operations in 
these provinces and how the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan may impact these 
operations. In this concluding chapter, the objective is to take a look at the strategy for and the 
implementation of COIN as a whole, and to try to give a more comprehensive picture of the 
extent to which the implementation of the core elements of the strategy have been successful, 
and for what reasons. As a part of this comprehensive picture, some conclusive considerations 
on the impact of the U.S. and Pakistani relations on the COIN operations in Nuristan, Kunar 
and, Nangarhar are presented. 
 
5.1 The New Strategy and Challenges in Measuring the Results   
From the preceding analysis of COIN operations in the three provinces, it is possible to make 
some general observations about the American lead COIN effort. One of the main points is 
the strategy itself. This analysis has taken as its starting point the Commander’s Initial 
Assessment (2009); President Obama’s speeches where he outlines the strategy for 
Afghanistan, and documents that specifically discuss COIN operations. In these documents, 
and in operations on the ground, it is important to define the specific goals that the campaign 
seeks to achieve. Within this objective, there are certain difficulties that complicate both the 
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creation of a strategy and the implementation of that strategy.     
 In the creation of a COIN strategy for Afghanistan, the trust from, cooperation with 
and communication with the population was to become a cornerstone of the strategy. It was 
considered of utmost importance to change perceptions within the population itself, and to 
change the operational culture of the soldiers who were conducting the counterinsurgency 
operations.
220
 It would be imperative that the counterinsurgency effort was conducted in a 
way that not only took into account the general difficulties of a COIN effort, for example to 
focus on the enemy’s weakness, what areas they are the strongest, what makes the population 
support the insurgents, what kind of action must be taken to weaken this support, and so on. 
The COIN effort would also have to be adaptable to the “unique complexities” that 
Afghanistan represented.
221
 That meant that the “national” insurgency was to be treated in a 
way that took into account that there were three regional insurgencies and not a single 
nationwide one that could be fought successfully with just one strategy or approach.
222
 The 
insurgencies that were identified were located in the south, north and east. To begin with, 
before McChrystal did his assessment, it would seem that most of the coalition forces where 
focusing their efforts in the south, trying to quell an insurgency in the least populated area of 
Afghanistan.
223
 This area was the main strategic launching area for the Taliban, but only 
focusing there would allow them to move somewhere else. McChrystal recommended to 
focus on all three, and not just one; this would mean that three COIN operations would have 
to be implemented with different strategies that would be adapted to local conditions.  
 To do this would mean a learning process for the American forces in COIN 
operations. This learning process for the counterinsurgents was a problem to the American 
and coalition soldiers. According to the assessment, the problem of operational difficulties 
had not been dealt with well enough in the past. It would seem as if it had not been taken into 
account at all. The problem with developing a comprehensive approach to COIN was the 
recognition that in this type of operation, there was no a silver bullet for the campaign and for 
Afghanistan itself. A silver bullet approach means that one discovers a tactic or strategy that 
works in every scenario. This would be impossible because of the regional differences in 
Afghanistan.           
 Though the assessment made by McChrystal and the Obama administration’s 
                                               
220 International Security and Assistance Force, Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment 30 August 
2009: 1.1-1.3 
221 Ibid. p. 1.1 
222 Ibid. p. 1.1 
223, Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon Afghanistan Index May 16 2012: p. 5 
79 
 
approach to operations in Afghanistan has reflected an understanding of this predicament, the 
full force of this issue seems not to have been recognized. This means that even though the 
general understanding is that there are regional differences within the insurgencies, the troop 
levels never became the numbers originally asked for to conduct successful COIN 
operations.
224
 This can be illustrated by comparing the request for troops in Afghanistan to 
successfully conduct COIN operations, to what was actually deployed there.
225
 The difference 
shows the lack of political will on the part of the administration to recognize the magnitude of 
what the campaign would require in total. The problem with assessing the progress in the 
implementation of COIN is that there is no comprehensive way of measuring it in a univocal 
way. There is no set way of measuring how well or badly a set of operations are going in an 
area. This means that to measure the results of the COIN effort, the person or organization 
who conducts the review of the operations has to choose a limited set of metrics based on 
what they are measuring the progress of. This creates a double edged sword for the validity of 
the assessment. On one hand, the entity conducting the review may very well choose those 
metrics that best support their initial perceptions. This opens for the possibility that one can 
find evidence for most arguments or positions within the vast data that exists on operations in 
Afghanistan; it is simply a question of selecting them. On the other hand, choosing metrics 
based on the strategy laid out by policy makers gives the opportunity to examine the metrics 
that best indicate how well an operation is going, in relation to the political reasons for the 
strategy. In the case of the strategy change set about by the Obama administration, which 
implied to focus much more on the population of Afghanistan, the so-called population 
centric approach to COIN, gives the researcher the ability to select metrics that for example 
reflect the population’s attitudes changes. In this analysis we have chosen metrics that are 
diverse, but that nevertheless have one aspect in common: They all relate to the population 
which is the base for the insurgency. All the metrics have been used to try to create an 
adequate analysis of the situation in each of the three provinces. Thus, one has to be aware 
that these metrics give an overview of how the progress has been in the area through the lens 
of “population centric” COIN. 
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5.2 Challenges in the Implementation of the New Strategy 
The assessments that have been made regarding the operations in the three provinces are 
several. First, the operations in all three provinces experienced setbacks as well as progress. 
There is no discernible clear positive progress; it is rather a few successes interrupted by 
failure. The magnitude of the failures appears not to be related to a single aspect, but to the 
interplay between several aspects combined with multiple certain failures. This was evident 
when analyzing civilian casualties in relation to difficulties in establishing a connection with 
the central government in Kabul. In instances where there had been civilian casualties caused 
by Afghan security forces and coalition forces, this also caused significant mistrust toward the 
government. The mistrust was amplified by the lack of ability for officials from the Afghan 
government to operate in the area. In addition to that, the use of shadow courts would also 
influence the civilian population’s attitudes toward the government in Kabul. This means that 
the failure of a COIN operation can be traced to the failure of maintaining focus on the 
interplay between several different aspects of the COIN operation. This kind of interplay 
between different aspects of COIN is not necessarily grasped by measuring the development 
by single metrics.           
 On the other hand, it seems that the success of one operation can be measured with 
one metric because it measures a specific reaction within the operation. A general positive 
trend can be traced through several of these metrics showing positive progress. However, if 
the other metrics indicate a problem or a negative result, this impacts the analysis of all the 
other metrics and questions what they really indicate. This could lead to a conclusion that 
negative impact is stronger within a difficult COIN operation. It appears that it would be 
easier to track negative progress rather than positive.      
 An example of what might be the consequences of this could be the decided 
drawdown of troops in 2014. This decision does not appear to have been made based on the 
assessment of sufficient positive progress with COIN in Afghanistan. Especially because the 
progress is difficult to measure accurately, it would now appear that the decision to withdraw 
forces is based on political assessments in the U.S., and not on positive progress in 
Afghanistan. Obama announced that there had been major strides made in Afghanistan with 
the partnering of U.S. and Afghan security forces.
226
 He also emphasized again the 
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importance of focusing on the objective, which is to remove al-Qaeda as a threat to the U.S.
227
 
The problem with this objective becomes even clearer when seen in conjunction with what 
has been documented from the use of metrics to assess the COIN operations. If the strategy 
does not work together with local conditions, it is very difficult to measure success. This 
seems to be the biggest strategic problem with the operations in Afghanistan. The objectives 
and goals are not in sync with the original mission, and neither is the decision to drawdown in 
2014. It appears to be a foreign policy decision made for domestic purposes. This means that 
the decision to drawdown is based on lack of political will on the part of the American public, 
rather than on the successful completion of goals in Afghanistan.     
 The implementation of the new strategy that would focus on the population as the 
main target for peaceful operations was started, as we have seen, after a period of time had 
gone by when the Afghan population had been waiting for the better part of six years for any 
improvement. Adding to this difficult situation was the growth of the insurgency, which for 
almost five years had been allowed to grow fairly unhindered, especially in the eastern part of 
Afghanistan. Focus had been on the south, north, and to some extent the area around Kabul. 
The change in strategy also would focus on the east, where McChrystal had assessed there to 
be a strong growing insurgency. This was not only because the area had been “left” by the 
effort to begin with, but also because of these provinces’ proximity to the Pakistani tribal 
areas, which now more than ever served as the safe havens for a growing number of militants. 
It would become clear that one of the greatest issues with implementing the new strategy was 
the nature of the insurgency in the east, specifically Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar, which 
share some of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The insurgents in these areas have been left alone 
for a longer period of time, which is compounded by these provinces’ proximity to the safe 
havens in Pakistan.           
 The consequence of all this was that the implementation of COIN was, and is, national 
and local at the same time. In a conventional war, one has a frontline which moves in either 
direction; forwards or backwards. Counterinsurgency operations are far more complex, and 
the “frontline” is to be found at a high number of locations at once. Some locations affect only 
local conditions. One example of this might be the location of a forward operating base (FOB) 
in conjunction with the location of a village. In that case, one could experience difficulties 
with getting the local population to trust the counterinsurgents and the Afghan government 
because the insurgent shadow governments provide better “services,” i.e. they produce 
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tangible results.           
 An example of a national problem is the use of air support and the adhering risk of 
civilian casualties by air strikes. As we have seen from the analysis of the three provinces, one 
of the main obstacles for achieving positive progress within the eastern regions was civilian 
casualties that were the result of air strikes. The United Nations reports on civilian casualties 
in Afghanistan corroborated this perception. This illustrates the difficulties with conducting 
COIN operations, and the multiple “fronts” that these operations have to be fought on. Even 
though insurgent Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) cause more than 60% of civilian 
casualties, which is far more than coalition caused casualties due to air strikes, the casualties 
caused by International Assistance and Security Forces (ISAF) seem to have mattered 
more.
228
 This was evident in all three provinces. It appears that the ISAF caused casualties 
weigh heavier than insurgent caused casualties. Whether this is due to the ability of the 
insurgents to capitalize on the operations failures of the coalition forces, or because faith in 
the security provided by ISAF forces is diminished, is difficult to establish. In any case, the 
multiple “fronts” put enormous pressure on the counterinsurgents, because they have to “win” 
every time on all fronts almost simultaneously. The insurgents only have to outlast the 
counterinsurgents, and can do so in a far more cost effective way. This is a problem that the 
new strategy faced, and that the operations in Afghanistan still face.   
 Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan faced some issues that made it more 
complex than it was expected to be. Part of that problem was the lack of a functioning 
government within the country. During the civil war in the nineties, and during the Taliban 
regime, there had been no real government to speak of that had functioned properly. This 
might be one of the issues that still faces the Karzai government today. Because of the lack of 
a functioning central government, there are many local and regional power structures that are 
difficult to work around and with. In addition to those regional and local structures, the 
government of Afghanistan also faces the shadow governments set up by the insurgents, 
which as noted earlier produce results that are immediate in the eyes of many villagers. In 
difference to this, many of the projects that are the responsibility of (or associated with) the 
central government, are not projects that show a rapid impact. This is not only due to a lack of 
government, but also due to a lack of resources for ongoing projects and the problems with 
making the results of the projects visible to the local people.    
 McChrystal’s assessment tried to take this into account by its analysis of what he 
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called the “information environment”, in which important parts of the perceptions of the local 
people are formed. The assessment describes the information environment as a “deed based” 
environment, where the most of the immediate results are those which get attention.
229
 The 
importance of this type of environment has shown to be evident in the case of both Nuristan 
and Kunar. These provinces are comprised of mostly villages, where word of mouth is the 
main source of information. The infrastructure for communication is not well developed in 
any of these two provinces, and that makes the local people more dependent on word of 
mouth, which in turn makes them more sensitive to negative progress, meaning civilian 
casualties or collateral damage. It would appear from the analysis of the two provinces that 
the strong negative impact of both civilian casualties and collateral damage, compared to the 
relatively sparse positive impact of the projects undertaken or supported by the government 
and ISAF, is linked to this “deed based” environment. Slowly progressing projects in more or 
less remote places do not really appear as “deeds” worth mentioning, and the less they are 
mentioned, the less their impact. Another impact on the attitudes of the civilian population in 
Nuristan and Kunar related to the “deed based” environment was that the counterinsurgents 
were not able to maintain security for those who assisted them. As seen earlier, the American 
COIN personnel left the province of Nuristan almost all together. It would appear that acts 
like that in a volatile province such as Nuristan, where HiG amongst others operate, would be 
a poor choice because the of the “word of mouth” structure in the more remote provinces. 
 A somewhat similar kind of problem can be illustrated with the population in Kunar, 
where in certain areas the faith in government and in the foreign troops is fair. The problem 
lies in Kunar’s close proximity to the border of Pakistan, where insurgents have a better hold 
on the people living there, and where the risk for foreign troops has historically been higher. 
That risk, combined with poorly developed infrastructure, has led to what could be described 
as an approach where the path of least resistance is king. This means that the Afghans have 
proved historically to be good at adapting to changing winds politically and militarily. On the 
other hand, the experiences from Nangarhar have shown that in areas where there is 
something to build on, however small the effort, things seem to be going better. Projects 
which run somewhat smoother, and the startup of others, have taken place in that province. 
Among them is the Afghan reintegration program, which can be considered a success in terms 
of Afghan standards. That may not be saying much for the overall assessment of the COIN 
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effort, but it has shown that it is possible to achieve success with some important elements of 
the COIN approach. This success has made it clear that some important criteria have to be 
fulfilled if such successes are to be obtained. That is; the resources required not only to start 
projects, but more importantly, to keep them going. This has been one of the COIN strategy’s 
largest problems. The time to be spent on, the quality of, and the resources devoted to projects 
are often skewed. This creates projects that face challenges in being continued after the 
startup period, and implementing the strategy of handing them over to the Afghans thus 
becomes even more difficult. These kinds of resource problems in dealing with the 
constructive aspects of the implementation, illustrate some key aspects that make COIN 
difficult.           
 Another key problem in the implementation of COIN can be represented by the 
keyword “culture.” A main effort made at the beginning of the Obama administration was to 
change the strategy to focus on the “population centric” dimension as the most important 
dimension to COIN. This focus implied several difficulties, of which the most common have 
been examined in this thesis; the aspects of culture. As has been seen from the analyses of the 
three provinces, the population of Afghanistan is diverse. There are villages and tribes that 
differ from each other; they have different needs and different approaches to the insurgents 
and the coalition forces. As has been noted, McChrystal therefore emphasized one particularly 
important aspect regarding the realization of the strategy: The implementation of COIN would 
have to be locally adapted to local requirements. For one thing, this would require more 
troops, but above all it would require that the troops and the strategy be flexible enough to 
counter the insurgents’ ability to exploit weaknesses in the population centric COIN effort.230 
 One of the more critical weaknesses in this respect was the lack of a sufficient number 
of troops. Therefore, the American forces are not able to maintain complete control of the 
areas of operations, which in turn leads to a drop in security for the local population. This 
represents an unfortunate paradox for the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. They 
cannot be in every village all the time, which gives the insurgents an inherent opportunity to 
counter any attempt to reduce the population’s support to the insurgents. This does not 
necessarily mean that the local population aids the insurgents willingly. Much of this support 
comes from the lack of any other alternative, as has been seen from the example with the 
shadow governments that have been set up by the different insurgent groups. Because of the 
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need to adapt to local requirements on the ground, the issues that the counterinsurgents have 
to deal with become localized as well. This means that the implementation of the COIN 
strategy has to take into account that it cannot be locally implemented without being tailored 
for the specific requirements on the ground. These requirements may vary significantly within 
a single province. In Nangarhar for example, there is both an urban and a rural population, 
and their needs cannot be met without examining the needs on the ground carefully. 
 Having to deal closely with culture is one of the features of COIN that differentiates it 
from other types of military campaigns. As has been seen from the analyses in chapter three, 
the importance of cultural understanding cannot be underestimated. As noted, the coalition 
seeks to rebuild an Afghanistan with a strong central government, which allows for some 
regional autonomy. The most common difficulty with this is the diverse cultures and the 
difficulties that the culture and way of life in Afghanistan creates for attempts to establish a 
“modernized” government of a Western kind. As seen from the argumentation of Thomas 
Barfield, the Afghans are not inherently opposed to centralized rule as some scholars paint a 
picture of.
231
 However, the culture in the eastern provinces is both urban and rural, and 
particularly among the latter we may find views on democratic political institutions that are 
somewhat conservative compared to a Western way of thinking. This is especially the case in 
both Kunar and Nangarhar, among the Pashtun tribes in the mountainous areas that border 
Pakistan. This may therefore not be the most ideal place to impose radical changes to political 
life and practices. It seems that with regard to culture in these areas, the U.S. would benefit 
from leaving some of the issues for an Afghan leadership, and to focus instead on the cultural 
aspects that can be impacted. For example, trying to move the population away from what 
could be considered medieval law practices, and showing by example that the government in 
Kabul can actually perform their duties to a satisfactory degree. It is important that 
expectations are raised to an acceptable level. Promises have to be adapted to what can 
actually be done. This is one of the issues that have plagued the COIN operations in the north 
eastern provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar. Even though the need for local adaption 
of COIN was emphasized in general from the beginning of the implementation, the discovery 
and acknowledgement that there were different insurgencies in different parts of the country 
may have come too late for the provinces that had received less attention.    
 The differentiated cultural landscape in Afghanistan is a general challenge to COIN, 
and as demonstrated in chapter three, the Pashtuns in the eastern provinces have a distinct 
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culture that can be difficult to combine with the westernized way of thinking about democracy 
and government. Adding to this difficulty are the relations that span the borders of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. The insurgents benefit from having relations that go back to the era of the 
Soviet invasion, or even further. The Pakistani tribal areas have housed sanctuaries for 
insurgent fighters for decades, and this creates a different climate for the insurgency to thrive 
in. So while the COIN operations in Afghanistan have to adapt to local conditions on the 
ground; a local tactical approach, it also has to be implemented on a strategic level, i.e. a 
national approach. This national approach, in turn, has to fit into an international approach 
that takes into account the local conditions in Pakistan. This illustrates the complexities that 
the proximity to Pakistani tribal areas adds to the already complex operational picture in 
Afghanistan for the U.S. counterinsurgency effort.   
 
5.3 Challenges in the U.S.–Pakistani Relationship       
The effect of the U.S –Pakistani relationship on the COIN effort in the eastern provinces of 
Afghanistan, is not something that is casual. It is difficult to measure in a definite sense how 
this relationship affects specific aspects. As the preceding analyses have shown, it is more of 
a continuous “push” effect. This means that the Pakistani influence on the COIN effort in 
these provinces is not linked to one specific action. Rather, it is the sum of American actions 
in Pakistan, in addition to Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy, that comes together to form 
an influence. The more specific impacts are therefore difficult to measure. In this thesis, the 
focus has been on three issues that from the scholarly literature seem to be of particular 
importance in understanding the main types of impact that the U.S.–Pakistani relationship has 
on the COIN operations in Afghanistan.        
 As has been noted, there is a difference between the impact that this relationship has at 
the strategic and tactical level, i.e. the national and local level. Nationally, Pakistan’s foreign 
policy, and especially their use and support of proxy forces, is an important strategic threat to 
the safety and security within Pakistan itself, and more importantly to this thesis, inside 
Afghanistan. Both the Haqqani network (HQN) and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) have 
been “employed” and supported by the Pakistani government, openly and covertly. This is an 
aspect which to a certain extent is separate from Afghanistan. According to most scholars and 
political commentators, these proxy forces are intended to give Pakistan depth in fighting 
India. It is therefore arguably more of a side effect that these groups also have a vested 
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interest in fighting “Jihad” in Afghanistan. They have kept their autonomy to a great extent, 
and the HQN have become far more self-sufficient than the Pakistani government would seem 
to like them to be. The HQN have also been excluded from peace talks, while the HiG have to 
some extent been approached about coming to the table in 2014. This gives Pakistan a 
problem when it comes to the relationship with the U.S. On the one hand they have HQN, a 
group that they support which in the eyes of the U.S. government and ISAF is regarded 
“irreconcilable.” On the other hand they support the HiG, a group that is a more acceptable 
option. This two sided foreign policy issue for Pakistan is also affected by U.S. actions in the 
tribal agencies of Pakistan. The drone program targets the Haqqani network and its supporters 
to a significant degree. However, this has shown to create and aid their cause as much as it 
removes threats, as seen in the analysis of drone use.    
 Earlier in this analysis, it has been established that it is not possible for an army to 
“kill” itself out of an insurgency. The COIN efforts’ focus on the population is important; it 
illustrates that there is no outcome that can be acceptable by using force as a primary means 
of establishing peace. This is common knowledge in Afghanistan; to gain any victories it is 
paramount to separate the population from the insurgents. The more insurgents that are killed, 
the more will take their place, based either on the notion of vengeance or the notion of a 
cause. It is also vital to create a government that the population trusts, and this has yet to be 
fulfilled in Afghanistan. The idea that some kind of democracy is the best way to establish a 
less unstable state is a cornerstone. The American drone program thus seems to be a paradox, 
as it is likely that it creates more insurgents than it removes. The goal is to strike at the most 
prominent insurgent leaders, and therefore seemingly cut of the head. Hence the drones target 
the personnel that the U.S. sees as legitimate targets; those whom if removed will cripple an 
organization. The analysis of these actions points toward a serious problem with what is 
accepted by the international community, and with how this is perceived in the areas where it 
is experienced. As seen earlier, there is a definite lack of focus in the western media regarding 
drone strikes, meaning their impact on civilian life and the legality of these types of 
operations. If the American government is to aid the Afghan government in creating a stable 
and democratic state that will survive the 2014 end point that Obama has set, then it appears 
very conflicting to use the number of drones that have been used against the tribal areas of 
Pakistan.            
 One could argue that the U.S., in using such measures to this degree, undermines their 
own credibility in operations in Afghanistan. This would arguably be worse in the areas of 
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eastern Afghanistan that share a border with Pakistan. The tribes in these areas do not actually 
regard the border between the two countries as a barrier, and they travel back and forth as 
they please for the most part. This means, as shown in chapter four, that the cultural and 
familial bonds stretch across the border in a way that may be impacted by the use of drone 
strikes. The U.S. could be causing more friction than it needs to by escalating the use of 
drones, as Obama has done over the course of his presidency.
232
 The paradox with this is that 
the officials, such as Admiral Mullen, have on occasion “attacked” Pakistan for the use of 
their proxy forces, and for how the Inter-Services Intelligence operates. Though not 
completely comparable, the two do share a divergent point. Each of the two parties, Pakistan 
and the United States, seek to achieve political and strategic gains through the use of these 
“techniques.” Pakistan on its part has used these types of forces for a very long time, 
seemingly in an almost institutional manner. The U.S. has also used the type of targeting that 
is now being conducted in the Pakistani tribal areas for an extended period of time.  
 In the media, the use of drones seems to receive far less attention than it warrants. 
Pakistan’s aid in the “War on Terror” is not something that is mentioned very often either. 
Arguably the Pakistani government is facing some very serious problems, and its difficult 
relationship with the U.S. requires a significant number of resources as well. The paradoxical 
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is very difficult to sum up in any short and concise 
way. However, some conclusions may be drawn. Pakistan is struggling with several 
significant domestic issues that require a strong government and a reversal of the dire 
economic situation. The country is also seeking to continue to subvert certain efforts in 
Afghanistan to attain “strategic depth” against Indian interests. It has its own very clear 
domestic and foreign objectives, which do not coincide with America or Afghanistan. This 
creates a very difficult climate for international relations for the government of Pakistan. 
Those difficulties are compounded by the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, which is 
waging its own insurgency against the Pakistani government. All these factors combine to 
build a multifaceted and three dimensional threat nexus against Pakistan’s own interests. The 
United States on its part is seeking to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the possibility of an 
Islamic fundamentalist safe haven in Afghanistan. That has been the objective since late 2001. 
That objective has turned into a massive nation-building effort in Afghanistan, with the goal 
of establishing at least to some degree a workable democratic solution for Afghanistan in 
                                               
232 Chris Kirk Obama’s 262 Drone Strikes in Pakistan June 8 2012 Slate; Pew Research Center Global Opinion 
of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted June 13 2012 Global Attitudes Project: p. 2 
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order to stem fundamentalist resurgence in the country. This has led to a long and strenuous 
mission in Afghanistan that is supposed to achieve its tentative end point at the end of 2014. 
Even after 2014, the U.S. will continue to struggle with the militants and terrorist 
organizations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The drone program is making it easier to conduct 
counterterrorism operations in areas that the government cannot do anything about in a 
conventional sense. This is the largest obstacle outside of Afghanistan for the U.S. The 
government in Washington cannot let militancy grow in these fairly uncontrolled areas; 
especially not when the President has cited this as their main objective in the region. The U.S. 
has to rely on Pakistan for control in the tribal areas. It would seem that the objective of 
combating terrorism and insurgency in these areas falls mostly on Pakistan, which in turn 
generates a problem for the U.S. The United States have poured money into Pakistan, and as 
Steven Krasner argues, this give without being given anything in return cannot and should not 
be allowed to continue.         
 The operations in Afghanistan are not impacted by one aspect of the U.S.–Pakistani 
relations. Rather it would seem that the sum of the actions of both countries combines into a 
toxic cloud on the eastern border of Afghanistan. In part, this is because the mission, as stated 
by America, does not include Pakistan having a strong influence over the government of 
Afghanistan. The trouble for Pakistan is that it is in need of the money that the relationship 
with the U.S. yields. They do not wish to be viewed by the American government as a country 
similar to Iran. Pakistan is therefore dependent on having a relationship that struggles along 
for the duration of the major American military presence in the region. To a degree, this 
presence dictates the Pakistani government’s ability to influence Afghanistan. As well, it 
limits the American ability to cut all ties with Pakistan, because they are a difficult partner. 
 In Afghanistan, this relationship is creating difficulties in the areas where stability is 
needed most. Because of the proximity of Pakistan’s unruly tribal areas to eastern 
Afghanistan, the impact of, for example, failed economic policies by the Pakistani 
government, could lead to an increase in militants who seek to fight “Jihad” against the 
American presence in Afghanistan. As a result of lack of options, combined with 
fundamentalist mullahs and religious scholars, this could lead to a dangerous increase in 
militancy, both for Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the other hand, it could also end up being a 
response to American unilateral behavior when it comes to the drone program. Killing 
insurgents has not been successful in stemming the influx of Pakistani based militants into 
Afghanistan. It would rather appear that these policies are creating more insurgents; not less. 
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The insurgents’ ability to use new media to relay their message creates further problems for 
the American government, as it struggles against a media image that is reinforced by both 
insurgent propaganda and anti-American interests in Pakistan.   
 Afghanistan is, and will be for a very long time, a country that is wrought between its 
artificial Western influence and its regional neighborhood. On the one hand there is the ISAF 
mission, and on the other hand there is the struggle with regional power brokers and the issues 
that arise from the lack of ability to control the country centrally. Every issue that faces 
Afghanistan is severely compounded by the international players, who seek to achieve 
political and strategic goals based not on what is best for Afghanistan, but rather what is best 
for them. This appears to be the best argument for why the U.S.–Pakistani relationship 
matters more than was first realized in the early stages of the “occupation” of Afghanistan. 
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